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TEACH YOUR JURORS WELL: USING JURY INSTRUCTIONS
TO EDUCATE JURORS ABOUT FACTORS AFFECTING
THE ACCURACY OF EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY
DEREK SIMMONSEN*
The case against Kirk Bloodsworth was strong. Five eyewitnesses
recalled seeing him near the location where a young girl was raped
and murdered, and they testified against him at his trial.1 It was
enough for two different Maryland juries to convict him of murder,
and for one judge to sentence Bloodsworth to death.2
The problem is that Bloodsworth did not do it.3 DNA evidence
exonerated him, leading the State to release him from prison and
later convict another man of committing the crime.4 According to
one recent study, erroneous eyewitness testimony is the single largest
Copyright  2011 by Derek Simmonsen.
* Derek Simmonsen is a second-year student at the University of Maryland School of
Law, where he is a staff member on the Maryland Law Review. The author would like to
thank Professor Amanda Pustilnik and Adjunct Professor Marc DeSimone for their advice
early in the research process. He also thanks the editors of the Maryland Law Review, particularly Notes and Comments Editor Lauren Genvert and Executive Notes and Comments
Editor Stephanie Bignon, for their insightful edits. Finally, the author thanks his wife,
Rachel, for her continuing support and encouragement.
1. TIM JUNKIN, BLOODSWORTH: THE TRUE STORY OF THE FIRST DEATH ROW INMATE EXONERATED BY DNA 4, 208–09, 219 (2004).
2. Id. at 164–66, 219–20. Indeed, it is well established that the availability of an eyewitness can change how jurors view evidence in a crime. See Roger B. Handberg, Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Identification: A New Pair of Glasses for the Jury, 32 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1013,
1022 (1995) (“[M]ost jurors simply assume that eyewitness identifications are infallible.”).
For instance, one study provided simulated juries with three different sets of facts surrounding a robbery. Id. at 1023–24. In the first scenario, there was no eyewitness to place
the defendant at the scene, only circumstantial evidence. Id. About eighteen percent of
jurors voted to convict in this scenario. Id. at 1024. A second simulated jury was given the
same facts, except that a store clerk identified the defendant as the culprit; about seventytwo percent of jurors voted for conviction in that scenario. Id. The last jury received the
same facts, except jurors learned the store clerk had very poor vision and was not wearing
his glasses at the time; despite this information, sixty-eight percent of jurors still voted to
convict the defendant. Id.
3. JUNKIN, supra note 1, at 257–58.
4. Id. at 257–58, 281. Ironically, the man ultimately convicted of the crime, Kimberly
Ruffner, spent time in prison with Bloodsworth, and the two were acquaintances. Id. at
276, 282. Bloodsworth had “spotted weights” for Ruffner and “[b]rought him library
books.” Id. at 276 (internal quotation marks omitted). Investigators confirmed Ruffner
was the murderer after they matched DNA from the crime scene with Ruffner’s DNA pro-
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cause of wrongful convictions in capital cases.5 Far from being an issue that only affects the wrongfully accused, victims of crime who incorrectly identify their attackers can be traumatized by both the guilt
of putting an innocent person in prison and the uncertainty that
comes with knowing their attacker is still loose.6
Although Bloodsworth v State7 became widely known because it involved the first death row inmate exonerated by DNA,8 the case is significant within Maryland for another reason. For decades, the legal
decision overturning Bloodsworth’s original conviction set the standard in Maryland for when courts could decide to allow expert testimony on eyewitness identification.9 Experts could testify regarding
social science research into how memory works and what factors impact it only so long as it was of “appreciable help” to the jury.10 The
Court of Appeals of Maryland’s skepticism about this type of evidence
was apparent from the negative tone used in the opinion.11
file on a national database. Id. Ruffner pleaded guilty to the crime and was sentenced to
life in prison in 2004. Id. at 282.
5. STANLEY COHEN, THE WRONG MEN: AMERICA’S EPIDEMIC OF WRONGFUL DEATH ROW
CONVICTIONS, at xvii (2003). Other significant factors identified in the study that led to
wrongful convictions included prosecutorial and police misconduct, inaccurate scientific
evidence, and forced confessions. Id.
6. See generally JENNIFER THOMPSON-CANNINO ET AL., PICKING COTTON: OUR MEMOIR OF
INJUSTICE AND REDEMPTION (2009) (discussing the friendship that Thompson-Cannino, a
rape victim, and Cotton, the man whom she mistakenly identified as her attacker, forged
following discovery of the misidentification and their crusade for the release of other defendants who have been wrongly incarcerated due to eyewitness identification error).
Thompson-Cannino describes feeling like “everything I staked my life on . . . suddenly fell
through a trap door” after learning of Cotton’s innocence. Id. at 213. In Thompson-Cannino’s case, her actual rapist was already incarcerated for another crime when she learned
the news that Cotton did not rape her, alleviating her fear of an attacker on the loose but
not her feelings of guilt for making a wrongful identification. Id. at 212–13. She eventually met Cotton, and the two now campaign together for the release of inmates in other
cases where they believe wrongful identifications have occurred. See id. at 243, 276
(describing how Thompson-Cannino and Cotton officially met one another and an Amnesty International event that Thompson-Cannino invited Cotton to attend with her).
7. 307 Md. 164, 512 A.2d 1056 (1986).
8. JUNKIN, supra note 1, at 269–70.
9. See Bloodsworth, 307 Md. at 177, 512 A.2d at 1062 (explaining that one of Bloodsworth’s exceptions to his original trial related to the trial court’s refusal to permit expert
testimony regarding the eyewitness testimony put forth by the prosecution).
10. Id. at 184–85, 512 A.2d at 1066 (quoting Shivers v. Carnaggio, 223 Md. 585, 588–89,
165 A.2d 898, 900 (1960)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
11. Bomas v. State, 412 Md. 392, 410, 987 A.2d 98, 108 (2010) (“We agree . . . that the
Bloodsworth opinion strikes a negative tone with respect to expert testimony on eyewitness
identification.”). The Bloodsworth opinion states that the “vast majority of courts have rejected [expert testimony on eyewitness identification] evidence” and sets out the arguments against allowing such evidence in court. Bloodsworth, 307 Md. at 181–85, 512 A.2d at
1064–67. The Bloodsworth court noted that cross-examination can reveal problems with
eyewitness testimony and reasoned that expert testimony on this issue would “‘invade the
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In the two decades since Bloodsworth was decided, courts around
the country have grappled with the question of how to incorporate
social science data about eyewitness perceptions into the courtroom.12
While it is well established that witnesses can be mistaken,13 scientists
have discovered that many of the common sense ideas people hold
about memory and perception, such as the link between certainty and
accuracy, are wrong.14 Given this finding and concerns about wrongly
incarcerating the innocent, courts have attempted to educate jurors
about these factors in various ways.15
The most common approach is to allow experts to testify about
factors affecting eyewitness perceptions at the discretion of the
court.16 Maryland has ostensibly followed this approach since the
Bloodsworth opinion, and the Maryland Court of Appeals reaffirmed
this standard in the 2010 case of Bomas v. State.17 Although Maryland
continues to allow this type of testimony at the discretion of the judge,
province of the jury’” and lead to a flood of experts testifying about a variety of witness
credibility issues. Id. at 182–83, 512 A.2d at 1065 (quoting State v. Porraro, 404 A.2d 465,
471 (R.I. 1979)) (citing United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 1973)). As
Bomas noted in his brief to the Maryland Court of Appeals, the “opinion advances all the
arguments against the admissibility of expert testimony, and provides no countervailing
observations which would educate trial judges as to circumstances in which expert testimony on eyewitness reliability would be helpful.” Petitioner’s Brief and Appendix at 19,
Bomas, 412 Md. 392, 987 A.2d 98 (No. 125), 2009 WL 611479. For this reason, the Maryland Evidence Handbook, in its third edition released in 1999, cited Bloodsworth for the proposition that expert testimony on eyewitness identification is “generally excluded” in
Maryland. Id. at 18 (quoting JOSEPH F. MURPHY, JR., MARYLAND EVIDENCE HANDBOOK
§ 1408 (3d ed. 1999)).
12. See infra Part II.
13. See ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS & JAMES M. DOYLE, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL, at xxi (3d ed. 1997) (describing how “[s]tories of erroneous convictions and incorrect findings of liability . . . have been a part of legal lore for a long time”).
14. See infra Part I.B.
15. See infra Part II.B.
16. See infra Part II.B.2. For much of the twentieth century, many courts declined to let
experts testify. See, e.g., Tanja Rapus Benton et al., On the Admissibility of Expert Testimony on
Eyewitness Identification: A Legal and Scientific Evaluation, 2 TENN. J.L. & POL’Y 392, 405–06
(2006) (discussing cases in which courts had declined to permit expert testimony). The
cross-examination of witnesses and the common sense knowledge of jurors were often
cited as tools for ferreting out a witness’s mistaken perceptions. See, e.g., Johnson v. State,
438 So. 2d 774, 777 (Fla. 1983) (“[A] jury is fully capable of assessing a witness’ ability to
perceive and remember, given the assistance of cross-examination and cautionary instructions, without the aid of expert testimony.”); State v. Goldsby, 650 P.2d 952, 954 (Or. Ct.
App. 1982) (holding that, despite the potential for eyewitness error, the law does not require experts “‘to debate the quality of the evidence for the jury’” (quoting State v. Calia,
514 P.2d 1354, 1356 (Or. Ct. App. 1973))).
17. 412 Md. 392, 404, 416, 987 A.2d 98, 105, 112 (2010) (explaining that Bloodsworth
had articulated the standard for admissibility of expert testimony before concluding that “a
flexible standard that can properly gauge the state of the scientific art in relation to the
specific facts of the case is best”).
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the Maryland Court of Appeals has indicated a greater willingness
than in previous years to accept this type of expert testimony at trial.18
In addition, the court has suggested that the Maryland pattern jury
instructions should be revisited in light of the latest research findings
on eyewitness perception and memory.19
This last suggestion—using comprehensive pattern jury instructions to instruct jurors about factors affecting eyewitness testimony—is
an approach that Maryland and other states should adopt.20 The discretionary standard in place throughout much of the country means
that not all juries will hear expert testimony about eyewitness identification.21 Given this limitation on admission of expert testimony coupled with research demonstrating that jurors lack knowledge about
weaknesses in eyewitness testimony,22 a substitute needs to be found
for the in-court expert.23 Already some states have taken the lead in
creating comprehensive jury instructions as a way to bridge this knowledge gap, a model that should now expand to the rest of the
country.24
This Comment will propose that states, including Maryland,
should revise their jury instructions to align with the latest social science research and to adopt policies, such as giving instructions at the
beginning of trial rather than at the end, that would improve juror
comprehension.25 This approach is likely to be the most effective and
easiest for the court system to administer, as pattern jury instructions
convey much of the same information as expert testimony without the
added time and expense associated with such testimony.26
To that end, Part I of this Comment will explain the science behind memory, how this science has been applied to issues faced by the
legal system, such as eyewitness testimony, and what areas of consen18. See infra text accompanying notes 167–70.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 172–74.
20. See infra Part III.B–C. Many states have some type of eyewitness identification instruction, but these instructions frequently contain information that is contradicted by social science data. See infra Part II.B.3.
21. See infra Part II.B.2.
22. See infra Part I.C.
23. See infra Part III.
24. See infra Part III.E. Criticisms of jury instructions—that they are not understood by
jurors and are an ineffective means of educating the jury about eyewitness factors—have
often kept attorneys from exploring this avenue in more detail. These concerns can be
addressed by altering the traditional method for delivering such instructions. See infra Part
III.D.
25. See infra Part III.
26. See infra Part III.C.
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sus have been reached among scientists.27 This Part also will question
how much of that information is within the common knowledge of
jurors.28 Part II will look at the various legal reactions to this research,
from early prohibitions on allowing expert testimony to the modern
approach, which generally permits experts to testify at the discretion
of the trial court.29 This Part will also examine the rise of jury instructions as an alternative method for teaching jurors about eyewitness
identification issues in light of concerns about expert testimony in this
area.30 Part III will advocate using jury instructions as an efficient,
cost-effective strategy for incorporating eyewitness research into the
courtroom.31 It will address criticisms of jury instructions and will explore various techniques that could lead to improved juror comprehension of these instructions.32 This Part will conclude by examining
pattern jury instructions used in other jurisdictions and will suggest
these instructions could serve as models for states to use to better inform jurors about eyewitness identification issues.33
I.

SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH INTO EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY
JURORS KNOW ABOUT IT

AND

WHAT

Scientists have learned a great deal in recent years about how perception and memory actually work.34 These observations have been
applied to the testimony of eyewitnesses, with psychologists reaching a
consensus on various factors that can influence the quality of eyewitness testimony.35 This research is not necessarily within the common
lay knowledge of jurors, an important observation because there has
been much debate about whether jurors require expert testimony or
specialized jury instructions to understand this information.36

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
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See
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A. How Memory Actually Works
Memory is far more complex a phenomenon than may be understood by the average person.37 Researchers divide “memory” into
three separate actions: the process of perceiving, remembering, and
recalling an event.38 Various factors can influence a person’s memory
at each of these three stages, with the potential of changing what may
be viewed as a “perfect memory” into a false recollection.39
Memory does not work like a TiVo,40 recording an event as we
perceive it and then allowing us to return to it again and again without alteration.41 Instead, researchers have divided the process of
memory into three separate stages.42 A person first perceives the
event, described as the acquisition stage.43 Then, time passes before
the person attempts to remember the information, called the retention stage.44 The final stage is when the person tries to recall the
stored information, known as the retrieval stage.45 There are multiple
factors that can impact memory at each of these stages.46
The acquisition stage is the point at which a witness first perceives
an event, a period that could last from a few seconds to several
hours.47 Researchers subdivide the factors that affect memory at this
stage into two categories: (1) factors that occur as part of the event
37. Cf. ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS ET AL., EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 2-2, at
12 (4th ed. 2007) (“[W]e do not simply record [events] in our memory as a videotape
recorder would. The situation is much more complex.”).
38. Id. at 12–13.
39. Id. at 13. To illustrate this possibility, Loftus and her co-authors cite an example in
which a small plane crash killed all the people on board and one person on the ground.
Id. § 2-1, at 12. One eyewitness to the crash testified that the plane was heading straight
down before impact, even though photographs demonstrated that the plane hit the
ground at a flat, low angle that allowed it to skid for 1,000 feet. Id.
40. Loftus and her co-authors have used the image of a “videotape recorder,” a piece of
technology that has become increasingly obsolete. Id. § 2-2, at 12; Chad Umble, Vanishing
VCR: Once the Viewing Standard, It’s Being Replaced by High-Tech Successors, INTELLIGENCER J.
(Lancaster, Pa.), Dec. 12, 2005, at A6 (“The VCR is facing extinction.”). A TiVo or DVR,
which record programs for later playback, are the more common modern counterparts.
See Umble, supra (“A quarter-century of evolution in home electronics has produced a
whole new generation of digital successors to the VCR [including the TiVo and DVR].”).
41. See supra note 37.
42. LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 37, § 2-2, at 12. This three-stage model is the basic theoretical approach used by psychologists studying memory. Id. at 12–13.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 13.
45. Id.
46. Id. These factors, which will be discussed in more detail in the following
paragraphs, include lighting conditions, the duration of an event, the amount of stress an
eyewitness was under when the event occurred, and the length of time that passes between
the event and the witness’s attempt to recall it. Id.
47. Id. § 2-3, at 15.
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itself and (2) factors that inhere in the witness.48 Factors that are related to the event include the lighting conditions49 and the duration
of the event.50 Factors inherent in the witness include considerations
such as the amount of stress a person is facing when the event
occurs.51
The second stage of memory is the retention stage.52 Factors that
can influence the retention of memory include both the normal process of forgetting and the receipt of postevent information that colors
how a person remembers an experience.53 It is not surprising that
people tend to forget information over time, but the extent to which
such forgetfulness can occur may not be fully understood.54 Studies
have shown that the process of forgetting begins almost as soon as a
person first receives new information.55 But forgetting is not the only

48. Id.
49. Id. Lighting involves more than just whether an event took place on a dark street
corner. See id. § 2-4 to -4(c), at 16–18 (explaining that witnesses who are in well-lit areas
and who suddenly move to dimly lit areas, or vice versa, may have difficulty immediately
perceiving details about an event).
50. As might be expected, the longer a person perceives an event, the better his recall
is likely to be regarding the details of that event. Id. § 2-5, at 19. The problem is that
people tend to overestimate the length of time that has passed, suggesting they had more
time to correctly remember an event than is actually the case. Id. at 19–20 (citing studies).
For instance, in one study, participants watched a thirty second simulated bank robbery
and were asked how long the event lasted. Id. at 20. No more than six percent of the male
viewers correctly stated the correct time; indeed, a small percentage of female viewers even
estimated that the event lasted more than fifteen minutes. Id.
51. Id. § 2-8, at 29. The role of stress in the process of memory is difficult to evaluate
because researchers have found that there is an optimal level of stress that actually improves event perception. Id. § 2-9, at 30. At low and high levels of stress, however, memory
is less likely to be accurate. Id. This theory, known as the Yerkes-Dodson Law, posits that at
both low and high levels of stress, people’s nervous systems are not fully functioning, which
may prevent sensory messages from “get[ting] through.” Id.
52. Id. § 2-2, at 13.
53. See id. § 3-2(a), at 53–54 (discussing the “common experience” of forgetting and
early research suggesting that people forget most information shortly after they learn it);
id. § 3-4, at 58–59 (explaining that postevent information “can do more than simply supplement a memory: it can apparently alter or transform the memory”).
54. For example, a study involving 271 actual police cases involving eyewitness identification revealed that the accuracy of suspect identification rates dropped substantially
within approximately one week of the crime. Bruce W. Behrman & Sherrie L. Davey, Eyewitness Identification in Actual Criminal Cases: An Archival Analysis, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
475, 475, 484 (2001). The study’s authors suggested this decline in identification rates
might be due in part to a greater caution on the part of witnesses “as the delay between the
crime and the identification increases.” Id. at 484.
55. LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 37, § 3-2(a), at 54; see also supra text accompanying note
53.
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factor that affects retention: Receiving new information after an event
can change how a person later remembers that event.56
The third and final stage of memory is the retrieval stage in which
a person tries to recall stored information.57 When retrieving information, subtle changes in questioning can elicit different answers.58
For example, one study found that people who watched a film of a
simulated accident incorrectly identified a broken headlight on a vehicle more often when asked, “Did you see the broken headlight?” instead of “Did you see a broken headlight?”59
Rather than being a simple process, the concept of memory involves multiple stages and a myriad of factors that can influence how a
person perceives and remembers events.60 It is only natural that scientists have applied this research to the legal system, which relies on incourt testimony from witnesses about their memories of events.61
B. Social Science Research on Memory and Its Application to Eyewitness
Testimony
In recent years, social scientists have conducted numerous studies
to learn more about the ability of eyewitnesses to perceive and remember events.62 As a result of this research, they have reached a consensus on certain factors that can impact the quality and accuracy of

56. LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 37, § 3-4, at 58–59. For instance, a person who witnesses
a car accident and later learns the driver was drinking might remember the driver’s actions
differently as a result. Id. In one study, participants viewed a video showing a car accident,
and researchers then asked them a series of questions about the video. Id. at 59. For
example, one of the questions asked how fast the car was traveling past a barn, even
though no barn existed in the video. Id. When questioned again about the accident one
week later, more than seventeen percent of participants who had been asked about a barn
remembered seeing one in the video. Id.
57. Id. § 2-2, at 13.
58. Id. § 3-11(a), at 70–71.
59. Id. at 71 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). Another example
yielding similar results involved the following questions—“How fast were the cars going
when they smashed into each other?” instead of “How fast were the cars going when they
hit each other?” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). People asked about cars “smashing” into one another provided higher speed estimates than those asked about the cars
merely “hitting” each other. Id.
60. Id. § 2-1, at 12–13.
61. See infra Part I.B.
62. See BRIAN L. CUTLER & STEVEN D. PENROD, MISTAKEN IDENTIFICATION: THE EYEWITNESS, PSYCHOLOGY, AND THE LAW 68 (1995) (noting that one of the book’s authors had
compiled more than 2,000 references to eyewitness research, with most of the references
involving scientific studies).
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eyewitness testimony.63 This consensus should inform the decisions
courts make about when and how to accept expert opinions in this
field.64
In the past forty years alone, there have been hundreds of studies
conducted in the area of eyewitness perception and memory.65 As far
back as 1989, at least one set of authors found a common consensus
among eyewitness experts as to factors that can significantly impact a
person’s ability to perceive accurately and remember an event.66
Three of these factors are worth considering because of the strong
consensus among eyewitness experts as to their validity.67 These factors are (1) the weak link between an eyewitness’s confidence and the
accuracy of his perceptions, (2) the difficulty eyewitnesses have with
cross-racial identification, and (3) the impact of postevent
information.68
The first factor, the lack of a connection between accuracy and
confidence in eyewitnesses, is “one of the most consistent findings in
the memory research literature.”69 Most studies find a weak or nonexistent link between an eyewitness’s subjective level of confidence and
63. See id. at 69–70 (citing studies in which social scientists evaluated responses provided by eyewitness experts related to “phenomena pertaining to eyewitness
identification”).
64. See Saul M. Kassin et al., On the “General Acceptance” of Eyewitness Testimony Research: A
New Survey of the Experts, 56 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 405, 405, 415 (2001) [hereinafter Kassin et
al., 2001] (suggesting the consensus that exists about certain eyewitness identification phenomena should guide decisions made by judges and lawyers).
65. Benton et al., supra note 16, at 426 (noting that there have been 469 eyewitness
experiments conducted in the past four decades).
66. See Saul M. Kassin et al., The “General Acceptance” of Psychological Research on Eyewitness
Testimony: A Survey of the Experts, 44 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1089, 1089, 1094 (1989) [hereinafter
Kassin et al., 1989] (citing wording of questions, lineup instructions, and the forgetting
curve as potential factors, among others). This consensus was confirmed in 2001 using an
updated survey of eyewitness experts. Kassin et al., 2001, supra note 64, at 405.
67. See Kassin et al., 2001, supra note 64, at 412–13 (noting factors on which “there was
a strong consensus . . . [of reliability]”).
68. See Kassin et al., 1989, supra note 66, at 1089, 1094 (noting that eighty percent or
more of the eyewitness experts initially surveyed considered these factors sufficiently reliable to present in court); see also Kassin et al., 2001, supra note 64, at 405, 412 (explaining
that ninety percent or more of the eyewitness experts in the updated survey considered
these factors to be “sufficiently reliable to present in court”). But see Ebbe B. Ebbesen &
Vladimir J. Konecni, Eyewitness Memory Research: Probative v. Prejudicial Value, EXPERT EVIDENCE, 1996, at 2, 24 (contending that research regarding eyewitness memory “lacks the
external validity necessary to be useful to jurors” and that any related findings should be
excluded from court because the prejudicial value of such findings outweigh their probative value).
69. Kevin Krug, The Relationship Between Confidence and Accuracy: Current Thoughts of the
Literature and a New Area of Research, 3 APPLIED PSYCHOL. IN CRIM. JUST. 7, 31 (2007).
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the accuracy of his memory.70 One meta-analysis of thirty-five eyewitness identification studies found that confident eyewitnesses were only
“somewhat more accurate” than eyewitnesses who were not confident.71 For this reason, it is not surprising that some commentators
criticize current jury instructions because they advise jurors to consider an eyewitness’s confidence in determining credibility.72
The second factor involves the ability of witnesses to identify people across racial lines. Identifying people of different races is a challenge, whether, for example, it is a white person identifying a black
person, or a black person identifying a white person.73 Numerous experiments have shown that people have an easier time identifying people of their own race and tend to make false identifications more
often when identifying people of other races.74 Because crime does
not occur solely between people of the same race, this factor can be
an important consideration at trial.75
Finally, information a witness receives following identification
can impact a witness’s memory.76 There is evidence that feedback on
70. Id. There have been a few studies challenging this connection. See Behrman &
Davey, supra note 54, at 486 (finding that “highly confident witnesses are much more
prone to choose the suspect in a criminal proceeding than are moderately confident
ones,” although the authors caution against an inference that confidence predicts
accuracy).
71. Jennifer L. Devenport et al., Eyewitness Identification Evidence: Evaluating Commonsense Evaluations, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 338, 349 (1997).
72. E.g., LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 37, § 14-5, at 430–31 (criticizing the Telfaire instructions for highlighting factors, in particular the confidence of eyewitnesses, without educating jurors about how these factors impact the accuracy of testimony). Indeed, the
Maryland Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions cite the witness’s certainty as one of the factors
jurors should consider in evaluating whether a person correctly identified the defendant.
MD. INST. FOR CONTINUING PROF’L EDUC. OF LAWYERS, INC., MARYLAND CRIMINAL PATTERN
JURY INSTRUCTIONS, MPJI-Cr 3:30: Identification of Defendant 93 (2006).
73. LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 37, § 4-13, at 103.
74. Id. at 103–04 (“There have now been a sizable number of cross-race studies completed. . . . The overall pattern was clear: witnesses did better at identifying suspects of
their own race than those of another race.”). For example, one study involved white and
black customers visiting small Tallahassee convenience stores and purchasing items from
both white and black store clerks. Id. About fifty-five percent of white clerks misidentified
a black customer, but only thirty-five percent misidentified a white customer. Id. at 104.
Real-life errors in cross-racial identification have also been documented, including a situation where five victims of a kidnapping, rape, and robbery incident each identified the
same man as the perpetrator. Sheri Lynn Johnson, Cross-Racial Identification Errors in Criminal Cases, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 934, 937 (1984). This man was, however, hundreds of miles
away at the time of the crime, and “other than his black skin, he bore no resemblance to
the original suspect.” Id.
75. Cf. Johnson, supra note 74, at 986–87 (noting the deep societal roots of cross-racial
identification problems and urging courts to act to ameliorate the effects of such
misidentifications).
76. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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eyewitness recollections, such as a detective telling witnesses that they
did a good job immediately after picking suspects in a lineup, can
impact certainty.77 Likewise, an eyewitness who first identifies a suspect from a selection of mug shots may be more likely to pick out the
suspect again in a live lineup because he remembers the person from
the mug shot, rather than as a result of an independent recollection
of the crime.78
Psychologists have reached a consensus on certain factors that
could influence the accuracy of eyewitness testimony in court, but this
consensus is not necessarily common knowledge among jurors.79
Therefore, in deciding whether to allow an expert to testify in this
field or to read a jury instruction, courts must understand what jurors
know about memory.80
C. Jurors Lack Knowledge About How Memory Works and What Factors
Influence It
The consensus among researchers about how perception and
memory work, and the way in which these concepts apply to the courtroom, is not within the knowledge of the average juror.81 Numerous
studies have shown that jurors are not aware of the factors that can
influence the accuracy of eyewitness testimony,82 creating a need for
the long-reluctant court system to consider how to address this knowledge gap.
Courts have a great deal of confidence in the ability of jurors to
make correct decisions, with some judges concluding that jurors’ lay
knowledge about memory is sufficient for them to evaluate eyewitness
testimony without the aid of experts.83 Even when finding expert testimony regarding eyewitness identifications potentially valuable to ju77. See Amy L. Bradfield et al., The Damaging Effect of Confirming Feedback on the Relation
Between Eyewitness Certainty and Identification Accuracy, 87 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 112, 119
(2002) (“Having eyewitnesses report their certainty at the time of the identification without the contamination of external influences might inoculate them against later certaintyinflating information. If so, their expressions of certainty during a trial might remain
uncontaminated.”).
78. CUTLER & PENROD, supra note 62, at 110.
79. See infra Part I.C.
80. See infra Part I.C.
81. See LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 37, § 6-6, at 130–31 (citing several common juror
misconceptions about eyewitnesses).
82. Id. For example, in one survey, only one-third of respondents recognized that it is
more difficult for people of one race to identify people of a different race, while nearly half
of respondents stated that cross-racial identification was no more difficult that identification within one’s own race. Id. at 131.
83. See United States v. Fosher, 449 F. Supp. 76, 77 (D. Mass. 1978) (“[A]verage lay
jurors, on the basis of their own life experiences and common sense, can make an in-
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rors, other courts have identified specific factors, such as the effects of
stress on memory and the manner in which the passage of time can
affect memory, to be within jurors’ common knowledge.84 Researchers in the field of memory, however, do not share the confidence of
these courts about the common understanding of jurors.85 For instance, the average person believes that eyewitnesses remember the
details of violent incidents better than mundane ones, that eyewitnesses are as likely to underestimate the duration of an event as overestimate it, and that confident eyewitnesses are more likely to be
accurate.86 In fact, research into each of these areas suggests the opposite is true.87
Studies of potential jurors are one way in which researchers have
sought to learn more about the lay knowledge of everyday citizens.88
One study, conducted in Florida in the early 1980s, was drawn from a
random sample of citizens.89 These potential jurors received informaformed evaluation of eyewitness testimony without the assistance of a psychologist . . . .”);
State v. Ammons, 305 N.W.2d 812, 814 (Neb. 1981) (same).
84. Bomas v. State, 412 Md. 392, 416, 987 A.2d 98, 112 (2010).
85. CUTLER & PENROD, supra note 62, at 195 (noting that “there are a variety of reasons
to be concerned about jury decisionmaking in eyewitness identification cases” because,
inter alia, jurors place too much trust in eyewitnesses and have difficulty differentiating
between accurate and inaccurate eyewitnesses).
86. LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 37, § 6-5, at 130–31.
87. See, e.g., id. (noting, for instance, that “[t]he added stress that violence creates
clouds our perception and memory, particularly for peripheral details”). In a study testing
this proposition, two groups of people were shown a video of the same incident, one in
which a man violently attacked a woman and another in which he merely asked for directions. Id. § 2-7, at 25. Those who watched the violent version of the video experienced
greater difficulty accurately describing what had occurred compared to those who viewed
the nonviolent scene. Id. Eyewitnesses also remember accidents or crimes lasting longer
than they actually do, particularly if an event is stressful or violent. Id. § 6-5, at 130. For
example, participants in a study were shown a forty-two second video where a man briefly
rocked a baby carriage but fled when a woman confronted him. Id. § 2-5, at 20. A week
after viewing the film, participants were asked how long the incident lasted: on average, the
witnesses estimated the incident lasted approximately ninety seconds. Id. Indeed, some
evidence even suggests that neither training nor experience increases the accuracy of eyewitness memories. See id. § 2-14, at 44–45 (explaining that “trained law enforcement personnel may not be better at the more mundane details”). For instance, the potential of law
enforcement officers to provide identifications that are just as inaccurate as regular citizens
was most recently demonstrated when a Washington, D.C., police sergeant mistakenly identified a fourteen-year-old as the driver of a vehicle involved in a deadly drive-by-shooting.
Avis E. Buchanan & Shawn Armbrust, Eyewitness Testimony in an Imperfect World, WASH. POST,
May 2, 2010, at C5.
88. See John C. Brigham & Robert K. Bothwell, The Ability of Prospective Jurors to Estimate
the Accuracy of Eyewitness Identifications, 7 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 19, 22 (1983) (performing a
study of prospective jurors to “assess whether their ‘common knowledge’ is sufficient to
enable them to accurately access what is likely to happen in actual eyewitness situations”).
89. Id. (“Subjects were selected so as to yield a sample equivalent to the samples of
prospective jury members compiled by the courts in Leon County, Florida.”).
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tion about a study conducted among college students in which the
students, without being told in advance, witnessed the staged theft of a
calculator from a classroom.90 The students were able to observe the
alleged thief for several minutes, were later shown pictures of several
individuals, including the thief, and were asked to identify the
culprit.91
The results from the Florida study suggested that the potential
jurors had difficulty predicting the frequency with which accurate eyewitness identifications occur.92 The prospective jurors estimated that
70.6% of the students would correctly identify the thief, while only
12.5% of the students correctly did so.93 The researchers also provided the potential jurors with descriptions of two more scenarios and
asked them to gauge the accuracy of eyewitness identification; on average, more than eighty percent of the prospective jurors overestimated
the likely accuracy of the eyewitnesses.94
Other studies have highlighted the gap between what researchers
have learned about memory and how it compares to commonly held
views among the public.95 In one study, the Public Defender Service
for the District of Columbia commissioned a polling firm to gather
data from 1,000 prospective jurors.96 The findings showed that jurors
generally did not understand the three-stage process of memory and
viewed it more like a person retrieving a recorded memory from the
brain, contrary to research findings.97 Juror responses were at odds
with other research findings as well.98 For instance, more than onethird of potential jurors in the survey indicated that the presence of a
90. Id. at 23.
91. Id.
92. See id. at 24 (noting that the potential jurors had “significantly overestimated the
percentage of students who were able to correctly identify the confederate-thief”).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 28. The second scenario in which the researchers asked the potential jurors
to estimate the accuracy of identifications took place in a convenience store. Id. at 23. The
researchers sent “customers” into convenience stores staffed by white clerks and had the
“customers”—both white and black—act in purposefully conspicuous ways, such as paying
only in pennies or asking for detailed directions. Id. The prospective jurors in the study
estimated that 51.1% of the clerks would accurately identify the black “customer” in a
lineup, but in reality, only 32.3% of the clerks did so. Id. at 24.
95. E.g., Richard S. Schmechel et al., Beyond the Ken? Testing Jurors’ Understanding of
Eyewitness Reliability Evidence, 46 JURIMETRICS J. 177, 193–94 (2006).
96. Id. at 194. The prospective jurors were asked questions about what factors make
some eyewitness testimony more or less reliable than other such testimony. Id. at 193–94.
97. Id. at 195–96. More than half of the potential jurors in the study either agreed with
a statement that memory of a traumatic event functions like a video recorder or said they
did not know whether the statement was true. Id. at 196.
98. Id. at 196–97.
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weapon would likely make an eyewitness’s memory of the event more
reliable, contrary to findings that it can distract a witness from remembering other details of the crime.99 Additionally, a majority of the
prospective jurors exhibited “a fundamental misunderstanding about
the confidence-accuracy correlation,”100 despite the demonstrated
lack of such a correlation in the scientific literature.101
The result of these studies has long led researchers to suggest
that courts adopt new methods for educating jurors about eyewitness
perceptions and memory.102 Deciding how best to educate jurors on
eyewitness identification issues, whether through the testimony of an
expert or specialized jury instructions, is a challenge the court system
continues to address.103
II.

THE LEGAL SYSTEM’S STRUGGLE
RESEARCH

TO

INCORPORATE EYEWITNESS

Eyewitness testimony has long been a concern of actors within the
justice system, but scientific research into the field did not begin to
receive much attention from the courts until the 1960s.104 Since that
time, the legal system has taken three main approaches to the science:
(1) banning expert testimony on eyewitness identification entirely, (2)
allowing expert testimony on eyewitness identification at the discretion of the trial judge, and (3) crafting a specialized jury instruction to
address eyewitness identification.105 The recent decision of the Maryland Court of Appeals in the Bomas case serves as a perfect illustration
of the debate occurring in courts around the country, as judges struggle to incorporate eyewitness identification research into the
courtroom.106

99. Id.
100. Id. at 199.
101. Three separate reviews of studies examining the relationship between confidence
and accuracy found a low correlation between eyewitness confidence and accuracy. Krug,
supra note 69, at 9. One set of researchers reviewed thirty-one studies, another research
team reviewed thirty-five studies, and a third group reviewed sixteen studies before drawing
their conclusions. Id.
102. Cf. CUTLER & PENROD, supra note 62, at 195 (“In sum, there are a variety of reasons
to be concerned about jury decisionmaking in eyewitness identifications cases . . . .”).
103. See infra Part II.
104. See infra Part II.A.
105. See infra Part II.B–C.
106. See infra Part II.B.2.
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The Legal System Moves from Early Rejection of Eyewitness Science to
Gradual Acceptance

Lawyers have long been aware of problems surrounding eyewitness testimony,107 but courts have been slow to incorporate social science research from the field. This reluctance on the part of courts
began to change in the late 1960s with a trio of cases decided by the
Supreme Court of the United States, leading more courts around the
country to consider the science behind eyewitness perception and
memory.108
Wrongful identifications and mistaken witnesses are not a new
concept in the criminal justice system. Edwin M. Borchard, a former
Yale Law School professor, published a book in 1932 detailing wrongful convictions, including those that occurred due to mistaken eyewitness identifications.109 As Borchard wrote, “Perhaps the major source
of these tragic errors is an identification of the accused by the victim
of a crime of violence. This mistake was practically alone responsible
for twenty-nine of these [sixty-five] convictions.”110 Future Supreme
Court Justice Felix Frankfurter111 was another early critic of eyewitness
evidence, disparaging it in his book on the Sacco and Vanzetti case.112
After concluding that the eyewitness evidence against the two men was
flawed,113 Frankfurter rhetorically asked, “What is the worth of identi-

107. See infra text accompanying notes 109–10.
108. Cf. NATHAN R. SOBEL, EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION: LEGAL AND PRACTICAL PROBLEMS
§ 1:1, at 1-1 to -2 (Dee Pridgen ed., 2d ed. 2002) (“On June 12, 1967, a significant date, the
Supreme Court decided the landmark trilogy of Wade-Gilbert-Stovall. This was the first attempt by the Court to establish effective constitutional safeguards governing the admission
of eyewitness evidence of identification in federal and state criminal trials.” (footnote
omitted)).
109. EDWIN M. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT, at xiii (1932).
110. Id. Borchard also noted that “the emotional balance of the victim or eyewitness is
so disturbed by his extraordinary experience that his powers of perception become distorted and his identification is frequently most untrustworthy.” Id.
111. President Franklin D. Roosevelt nominated Justice Frankfurter to the Court, and
Justice Frankfurter was commissioned on January 19, 1939. See Felix Frankfurter, OYEZ,
http://www.oyez.org/justices/felix_frankfurter (last visited Apr. 15, 2011).
112. FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE CASE OF SACCO AND VANZETTI: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS FOR
LAWYERS AND LAYMEN 30 (1927). Sacco and Vanzetti were Italian immigrants charged with
killing two men in a robbery. Jon Umarov, Book Review, CHAMPION MAG., Mar. 2010, at 61
(reviewing SACCO AND VANZETTI (First Run Features 2007)). Worldwide protests ensued
over their conviction and execution, as many thought they were killed because of their
radical political views rather than because of their participation in the murder. Id.
113. See FRANKFURTER, supra note 112, at 31. (“All the identifying witnesses were speaking from casual observation of men they had never seen before, men of foreign race,
under circumstances of unusual confusion.”).
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fication testimony even when uncontradicted? The identification of
strangers is proverbially untrustworthy.”114
Although lawyers were historically critical of eyewitness testimony,115 the legal system was not quick to embrace psychological science.116 More than 100 years ago, Hugo Münsterberg complained
about judicial hostility to psychological evidence being used in the
courtroom.117 Some of the early research he cited, though not accepted by courts at the time, would eventually find support in the legal community.118 This research included studies that questioned the
accuracy of eyewitness identifications and accounts.119
Indeed, the first appellate court decision addressing the use of an
expert to discuss the limits of eyewitness perception was written in
1931.120 The case involved a robbery in which eyewitnesses identified
the defendant, and the defendant then sought to have an expert testify about eyewitness identification of strangers.121 The court held it
was not error to exclude the testimony, as jurors could decide for
themselves whether the victims of the crime were able to properly recognize the defendant.122 This type of reasoning was common in early
cases addressing the subject.123
114. Id. at 30.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 109–14.
116. Cf. LOFTUS & DOYLE, supra note 13, at xxi (paraphrasing Wigmore as claiming that
when psychologists were sufficiently ready for the courts, the courts would be ready for the
psychologists).
117. HUGO MÜNSTERBERG, ON THE WITNESS STAND: ESSAYS ON PSYCHOLOGY AND CRIME 46
(1908) (“The Court would rather listen for whole days to the ‘science’ of the handwriting
experts than allow a witness to be examined with regard to his memory and his power of
perception, his attention and his associations, his volition and his suggestibility, with methods which are in accord with the exact work of experimental psychology.”).
118. Cf. id. at 51–53 (describing, as an example, a meeting of jurists, psychologists, and
physicians at which an experiment was conducted to demonstrate that even “men well
trained in careful observation” erred in their eyewitness observations).
119. E.g., id. at 51–53. Münsterberg described one experiment where a meeting was
broken up by a clown being chased by a man with a gun. Id. at 52. Of the forty witnesses to
the incident, only six provided descriptions that did not include false statements. Id. The
witness estimates of the incident’s duration varied from a few seconds to several minutes.
Id. at 53.
120. Edward Stein, The Admissibility of Expert Testimony About Cognitive Science Research on
Eyewitness Identification, 2 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 295, 297 (2003) (citing Criglow v. State,
36 S.W.2d 400 (Ark. 1931), as “[t]he first appellate case that discusses expert testimony on
the cognitive limitations of eyewitnesses”).
121. Criglow, 36 S.W.2d at 401.
122. Id.
123. Cf. Stein, supra note 120, at 297 (“Many courts have, like the Criglow court, viewed
expert testimony on eyewitness identification with suspicion and, historically, most have
excluded such expert testimony.”).
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The court system did not begin to embrace scientific findings
concerning eyewitnesses until the late 1960s when the United States
Supreme Court began to enter this area in earnest.124 A trio of Supreme Court cases decided in 1967 established constitutional safeguards relating to eyewitness identifications.125 Later, in the 1972 case
of Neil v. Biggers,126 the Court identified factors that could be used to
evaluate the reliability of eyewitness identifications in order to determine whether the police had violated the defendant’s due process
rights.127 At approximately the same time, the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit created a pattern instruction for eyewitness testimony that numerous courts have since employed as a model.128 Recognition of the problems of eyewitness
testimony by other appellate courts paved the way for other courts
around the country to address the subject.129
As courts began to acknowledge the shortcomings of eyewitness
testimony, one question in particular frequently arose: Whether to allow expert witnesses to testify about the science surrounding eyewitness identifications.130 The first appellate case in which an eyewitness
124. Cf. SOBEL, supra note 108, § 1:1, at 1-2 to -3 (citing numerous court decisions discussing eyewitness identification after the Court’s decisions in Wade, Gilbert, and Stovall).
125. Id. at 1-1 to -2; see United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236–37 (1967) (holding that
a post-indictment lineup is a “critical stage of the prosecution” at which the defendant is
entitled to have counsel); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 269–70, 272–73 (1967) (holding that admission of eyewitness identifications at trial that were obtained during a lineup
without the presence of the defendant’s counsel violated the defendant’s constitutional
rights); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967) (concluding that Wade and Gilbert would
not be applied retroactively), overruled by Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987). These
decisions were undercut in subsequent years. See, e.g., SOBEL, supra note 108, § 1:5, at 1-12
(explaining that later cases have rendered Wade “virtually a dead letter”). The law surrounding lineups is very detailed and beyond the scope of this Comment.
126. 409 U.S. 188 (1972).
127. Id. at 198–200 (listing as relevant factors (1) “the opportunity of the witness to view
the criminal at the time of the crime”; (2) “the witness’ degree of attention”; (3) “the
accuracy of the witness’ prior description of the criminal”; (4) “the level of certainty
demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation”; and (5) “the length of time between
the crime and the confrontation”).
128. See United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552, 558–59 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (providing
model instructions for eyewitness identification); see also infra text accompanying notes
214–15, 223–25 (discussing use of Telfaire’s pattern instruction as a model jury instruction).
129. Cf. State v. Warren, 635 P.2d 1236, 1243 (Kan. 1981) (noting that appellate courts
had traditionally disregarded the potential for injustice in eyewitness testimony, but that
“more recent decisions recognize the serious nature of the problem”).
130. See, e.g., People v. McDonald, 690 P.2d 709, 711 (Cal. 1984) (“We address here a
contention that is increasingly heard in the courts . . . [whether] it may be an abuse of
discretion to exclude . . . [expert] testimony . . . on psychological factors shown by the
evidence [to potentially] affect the accuracy of an eyewitness identification of the defendant.”), overruled on other grounds by People v. Mendoza, 4 P.3d 265 (Cal. 2000).
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expert was permitted to testify did not occur until 1983.131 In that
case, the appellate court found that the trial court had abused its discretion by refusing to allow an expert to testify when an eyewitness
identified a person other than the defendant in the photo array and
testimony from several witnesses indicated the defendant was not in
the state when the crime occurred.132 Throughout the 1980s, courts
across the country continued to hear cases regarding the admission of
expert testimony on eyewitness identifications.133
By the 1980s, judges recognized that eyewitness testimony was not
always reliable, and they appeared more willing to accept scientific
findings surrounding memory and perception.134 But deciding if, and
how, this information should reach jurors would become a heated debate, with courts reaching varying conclusions about the best approach to take regarding eyewitness identification evidence.135
B. Courts Struggle with How Best to Address Scientific Findings About
Eyewitness Identifications
Before accepting psychological research into eyewitness testimony, judges must ensure that the science itself is reliable, a process
governed by state or federal rules of evidence.136 Even though judges
and commentators have generally deemed the science underlying eye131. Wayne T. Westling, The Case for Expert Witness Assistance to the Jury in Eyewitness Identification Cases, 71 OR. L. REV. 93, 113 (1992) (“The earliest appellate case allowing an expert
eyewitness was State v. Chapple, [660 P.2d 1208 (Ariz. 1983)] decided by the Arizona Supreme Court in 1983.” (footnote omitted)).
132. Chapple, 660 P.2d at 1212, 1222–24.
133. Westling, supra note 131, at 114–17 (citing cases). California considered the issue
not long after the Chapple decision, holding in People v. McDonald that expert testimony on
eyewitness identifications, which fell within the trial judge’s discretion, could be appropriate in certain cases. 690 P.2d at 711; see also State v. Buell, 489 N.E.2d 795, 801 (Ohio
1986) (stating that the defendant’s arguments had persuaded the court that expert testimony relating to eyewitness identifications “could be helpful to a jury and should not be
held as inadmissible in every instance”).
134. See supra text accompanying notes 130–33.
135. See infra Part II.B.
136. See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993) (“[T]he
Rules of Evidence—especially Rule 702—do assign to the trial judge the task of ensuring
that an expert’s testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at
hand. Pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid principles will satisfy those demands.”); Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (holding that “while
courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized
scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it
belongs”), superseded by rule, FED. R. EVID. 702, as recognized in Daubert, 509 U.S. 579; see also
LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 37, § 13-6, at 363–64 (“To gain the admission of expert testimony, it is necessary to persuade the judge that the proposed testimony passes through [a
filter] . . . designed to exclude what might be called ‘bad science’ . . . .”).
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witness testimony to be reliable,137 courts have taken three different
approaches to eyewitness identification research: (1) to preclude expert testimony and instruction to the jury regarding eyewitness research, an approach that has now been abandoned by state courts;138
(2) to permit expert testimony at the discretion of the trial judge, the
approach favored by the Maryland Court of Appeals in its recent
Bomas decision;139 or (3) to use jury instructions to educate jurors
about eyewitness identification research.140
1. Barring Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Identifications
Even though the science underlying eyewitness identification research is now viewed as reliable, courts once routinely excluded expert testimony on eyewitness identification using two principal
137. Evidence demonstrates that expert testimony about eyewitness identifications satisfies both the Daubert and Frye standards for reliability. First, under Daubert, there is reason
to believe that the science surrounding eyewitness testimony is sound enough to pass legal
muster. See Gary L. Wells & Lisa E. Hasel, Eyewitness Identification: Issues in Common Knowledge and Generalization, in BEYOND COMMON SENSE: PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 160–61 (Eugene Borgida & Susan T. Fiske eds., 2008) (explaining four findings
demonstrating reliability in expert testimony on eyewitness identifications). Second, the
science behind eyewitness identifications is generally accepted in the field, thereby satisfying the Frye standard, which is used by many states that do not subscribe to Daubert. See
LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 37, § 13-9, at 368 (“Even under the restrictive test of ‘general
acceptance’ laid out in Frye v. United States, there is little doubt that the method of experimental psychology is not in question . . . .”). Although Maryland generally follows the Frye
test, the Court of Appeals has declined to apply that test to expert testimony on eyewitness
identification, instead analyzing whether the evidence would be of appreciable help to the
trier of fact in such cases. Compare Montgomery Mut. Ins. Co. v. Chesson, 399 Md. 314,
327, 923 A.2d 939, 946 (2007) (“Maryland adheres to the standard set forth in Frye v. United
States for determining the admissibility of scientific evidence and expert scientific testimony.” (citation omitted) (citing Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 389, 391 A.2d 364, 372
(1978))), with Bloodsworth v. State, 307 Md. 164, 184, 512 A.2d 1056, 1066 (1986) (noting
that expert testimony on eyewitness identification is not similar to other experimental techniques, such as voice-prints, that Maryland courts had previously examined under Frye). See
generally Nancy E. Bonifant, Note, Blackwell v. Wyeth: It’s Our Courtroom and We’ll Frye Only
if We Want To—The Maryland Court of Appeals’s Unstated Adoption of Daubert, 69 MD. L. REV.
719 (2011).
As more studies have been conducted on eyewitness testimony, the science has continued to gain reliability and acceptance by courts. See State v. Copeland, 226 S.W.3d 287, 302
(Tenn. 2007) (holding that it was not harmless error to exclude expert testimony on eyewitness identification, which was found to be reliable). Additionally, DNA exonerations
starting in the early 1990s have begun to prove conclusively that there have been cases
where eyewitnesses were clearly mistaken, a scientific method that has only become available in the past twenty years. See Wells & Hasel, supra, at 159 (describing how more than 200
people who were convicted by juries had been proven innocent through DNA testing, with
about seventy-five percent of the cases involving mistaken identification evidence).
138. See infra Part II.B.1.
139. See infra Part II.B.2.
140. See infra Part II.B.3.
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justifications: (1) the availability of cross-examination permitted counsel to address witness perception and memory, and (2) the science
behind memory was deemed to be within a juror’s lay knowledge.141
Courts flatly prohibiting expert testimony on eyewitness identification
issues are virtually nonexistent today,142 and valid criticisms of the arguments used to support this former prohibition on experts demonstrate why this approach fell into disrepute.
Courts often view cross-examination as an adequate means to attack an eyewitness’s ability to perceive or remember events.143 Its supporters have long extolled the virtues of cross-examination as “the
greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth.”144 Additionally, courts have assumed that any deficiency in a witness’s perception or memory can be brought out through sharp questioning by
an astute attorney.145
There are, however, limits to what cross-examination can do in a
situation where a witness may be mistaken but has no apparent bias or
motive to lie, and may not be aware that what he is saying is incorrect.146 For instance, the issue of cross-racial identification can be succinctly explained but is difficult to explore on cross-examination.147
141. See Handberg, supra note 2, at 1038 (cross-examination justification); Westling,
supra note 131, at 104–05 (common knowledge justification).
142. See Benton et al., supra note 16, at 404 (citing Tennessee as the only state with a
prohibitory approach); see also Copeland, 226 S.W.3d at 302 (abandoning Tennessee’s prohibitory approach to allow for expert testimony on eyewitness identification where the testimony was “reliable and would have been of substantial assistance to the jury”).
143. Jules Epstein, The Great Engine That Couldn’t: Science, Mistaken Identifications, and the
Limits of Cross-Examination, 36 STETSON L. REV. 727, 728 (2007).
144. 3 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE
IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW INCLUDING THE STATUTES AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS OF ALL JURISDICTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA § 1367, at 27 (2d ed. 1923).
145. See Epstein, supra note 143, at 728–29 (“Counsel can both cross-examine the identification witnesses and argue in summation as to factors causing doubts as to the accuracy of
the identification . . . .” (quoting Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 348 (1981))).
146. See BRIAN L. CUTLER, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: CHALLENGING YOUR OPPONENT’S WITNESS 97 (2002) (“Cross-examining a neutral, credible, and confident eyewitness is a challenge for even the most experienced and successful attorneys. The likelihood that a
committed eyewitness will recant his position (or fall apart on the stand) is so minimal that
it is hardly worth considering.”).
147. See Epstein, supra note 143, at 775–76 (describing race as “one of the most sensitive
issues in American society and discourse” and explaining the difficulties that arise when
trying to explore race bias in eyewitness identifications). Epstein uses “Sir, isn’t it true that
you are better at identifying people of your own race than African-Americans?” as an example of a question that addresses cross-racial identification but is likely to offend both the
witness and the jury. Id. at 775. This result obtains because the question suggests that the
witness may be racist, an accusation that the witness and jurors might consider insulting if
asked without a proper foundation. See id. Equally limiting is the likelihood that the witness will merely answer “no” to the question, even if studies suggest that he would have a
harder time identifying people of a different race than his own. Id.; see supra notes 73–75
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Because witnesses only face cross-examination about subjects of which
they have direct knowledge,148 and attorneys are not permitted to testify directly to the jury,149 educating jurors about cross-racial identification, or other research into eyewitness testimony, solely through
cross-examination is difficult.150
The other principal justification courts have invoked when excluding expert testimony regarding eyewitness identification is that
the information rests in the lay knowledge of jurors.151 Research into
what jurors understand about how perception and memory work show
that this justification lacks support.152
2. Allowing Expert Testimony on a Discretionary Basis: The Bomas
Case
The second, and most common, approach to expert testimony is
to allow it at the discretion of the trial judge.153 The Maryland Court
of Appeals took this approach in the Bomas case, a 2010 decision that
illustrates the considerations judges weigh in deciding how best to incorporate social science research into eyewitnesses identifications at
trial.154 The court considered the alternatives to the use of expert
testimony, which included a fresh look at the state’s jury instructions
surrounding eyewitness testimony, before concluding that decisions
about the use of expert testimony on eyewitness identification should
and accompanying text. Finally, Epstein posits that directly asking a witness about studies
demonstrating problems in cross-racial identification is likely to elicit the following answer:
“I don’t know what you’re talking about.” Epstein, supra note 143, at 775–76 (internal
quotation marks omitted). As these examples illustrate, “there can be no effective crossexamination on the phenomenon of cross-racial bias.” Id. at 776.
148. See GLEN WEISSENBERGER & JAMES J. DUANE, FEDERAL EVIDENCE 241 (4th ed. 2001)
(quoting Federal Rule of Evidence 602, which generally limits witness testimony to matters
about which the witness has personal knowledge).
149. See United States v. Alu, 246 F.2d 29, 33 (2d Cir. 1957) (“It has been widely recognized that lawyers representing litigants should not be called as witnesses in trials involving
those litigants . . . .”).
150. E.g., Epstein, supra note 143, at 776.
151. Westling, supra note 131, at 104–05. An additional justification sometimes invoked
is that expert testimony is unfairly prejudicial because it could tilt the scales too greatly in
favor of the party offering it. Handberg, supra note 2, at 1039.
152. See supra Part I.C.
153. Benton et al., supra note 16, at 404–05 (noting that ninety-eight percent of states
“take a discretionary approach” when determining whether to admit an eyewitness expert).
154. Bomas v. State, 412 Md. 392, 407–16, 987 A.2d 98, 106–12 (2010) (reaching the
following conclusion after carefully weighing the arguments related to use of expert testimony in eyewitness identification cases: “the application of [the test for admitting expert
testimony on eyewitness identification] is ‘a matter largely within the discretion of the trial
court[ ]’” (quoting Bloodsworth v. State, 307 Md. 164, 185, 512 A.2d 1056, 1067 (1986))
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
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remain in the trial judge’s discretion.155 The main drawback of this
approach is that it can be discretionary in theory but prohibitory in
practice.156
The facts of the Bomas case are straightforward. In 2004, an offduty detective named Kenneth Bailey stopped his truck in traffic
around 2 A.M. near a Baltimore bar.157 While he was stopped, he
heard six to eight gunshots come from a crowd standing on the sidewalk, and he watched as a black male shot and killed another black
male.158
The gunman, later identified as Tavon Bomar,159 ran away from
the crowd, passing within about a car length of where Bailey’s truck
was stopped.160 Bailey drew his gun and attempted to follow Bomar
but was delayed and unable to apprehend him.161 A week after the
incident, Bailey filed a report, describing the shooter as “a black
male.”162 After receiving information from an informant approximately six months later, police created a photo array from which Bailey identified Bomar as the gunman.163
At trial, Bomar sought to introduce testimony from a licensed psychologist and expert in neuropsychology, who offered testimony on
several factors that could impact the accuracy of the eyewitness identification in the case.164 The motions judge declined to admit the testimony, ruling that “it would be unhelpful to a jury and that a jury was
capable of appropriately evaluating and weighing the eyewitness
identifications.”165
The Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed Bomar’s second-degree
murder conviction, holding that the trial court did not err in declin155. See infra text accompanying notes 168–74.
156. See Benton et al., supra note 16, at 404–05 (noting that one-third of the states that
purport to “take a discretionary approach” had used such “harsh language” when finding
expert testimony inadmissible as “to suggest a nearly per se rule of exclusion”).
157. Bomas, 412 Md. at 395, 987 A.2d at 100.
158. Id. at 395–96, 987 A.2d at 100.
159. Although identified as “Bomas” in court documents, the defendant’s last name is
actually Bomar; Bomas was one of the defendant’s known aliases. Id. at 395 n.1, 987 A.2d
at 99 n.1.
160. Id. at 396, 987 A.2d at 100.
161. Id.
162. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
163. Id.
164. Id. at 397, 987 A.2d at 100–01. The factors that Bomar’s expert sought to discuss
included the following: the weak link between confidence and accuracy, the impact of
stress and the passage of time on memory, and the tendency for jurors to believe eyewitness testimony even when substantial weaknesses are exposed through the process of crossexamination. Id.
165. Id. at 401, 987 A.2d at 103.
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ing to allow testimony from Bomar’s expert.166 In so ruling, the court
stated that trial courts have the discretion to admit expert testimony
on eyewitness identification if it is of “appreciable help to the trier of
fact.”167
In its decision, the court recognized that scientific advances in
the area of memory had progressed significantly since the court last
visited the issue twenty-four years earlier in Bloodsworth v. State168 and
acknowledged that experts in the field may have insights that are beyond the ken of a layperson.169 Recognizing that jurisdictions now
generally trend toward admitting expert testimony, and that this information could be helpful to jurors, the Bomas court stated that trial
courts should be mindful of the scientific advances in the area of eyewitness testimony research.170 Despite this conclusion, however, the
court reasoned that not all factors of eyewitness identification are beyond the experience of a jury and refrained from requiring courts to
admit expert testimony on the subject, thus upholding a discretionary
standard.171
The court thus declined Bomar’s invitation to make this type of
evidence presumptively admissible in all circumstances, although the
court did suggest that jury instructions might be a useful substitute.172
One of the court’s concerns about automatically admitting expert testimony on eyewitness identification was that it would lead to a “battle
of the experts” that would take over the trial and confuse jurors.173
The court explained that expert testimony is not the only avenue to
use in educating jurors about eyewitness testimony, and suggested that
the Maryland Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction Committee should
166. Id. at 395, 423, 987 A.2d at 99, 116.
167. Id. at 416–17, 987 A.2d at 112 (quoting Bloodsworth v. State, 307 Md. 164, 184, 512
A.2d 1056, 1066 (1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
168. In Bloodsworth, the Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s decision to exclude an
expert’s testimony, holding that the standard for the admissibility of expert testimony on
eyewitness identification is “whether [the expert’s] testimony will be of real appreciable
help to the trier of fact in deciding the issue presented.” 307 Md. at 184, 512 A.2d at 1066
(internal quotation marks omitted). The Bomas decision acknowledged the Bloodsworth
court’s “negative tone” toward expert testimony on eyewitness identification. Bomas, 412
Md. at 410, 987 A.2d at 108.
169. Bomas, 412 Md. at 416, 987 A.2d at 112.
170. Id. (“Thus, it is time to make clear that trial courts should recognize these scientific
advances in exercising their discretion whether to admit such expert testimony in a particular case.”).
171. Id. (citing stress and passage of time as factors affecting memory that are within the
common knowledge of jurors).
172. Id. at 417–18, 987 A.2d at 112–13.
173. Id. at 419, 987 A.2d at 113–14.
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consider modifying its current instructions in light of new scientific
studies related to the reliability of eyewitness perceptions.174
The Bomas court’s reasoning reflects much of the debate that has
occurred around the country concerning eyewitness identification evidence.175 Despite the wealth of social science evidence regarding eyewitness identification, courts have expressed countervailing concerns
about that information being within a jury’s lay knowledge or too general to be helpful and about creating a battle of the experts.176
Maryland’s discretionary approach is followed by the majority of
states, which means that in practice experts will only testify infrequently about eyewitness identification issues.177 Judges retain a great
deal of control in this area, and appellate courts typically do not consider exclusion of this evidence to infringe on a defendant’s rights.178
Even among courts that follow a discretionary standard, judges remain reluctant to admit expert testimony on eyewitness identification.179 Indeed, a recent analysis of eyewitness identification cases
found that courts uphold the exclusion of such testimony far more
174. Id. at 418, 987 A.2d at 113. Applying this rationale to the facts of Bomar’s case, the
Court of Appeals then agreed with the trial court that the proposed expert testimony was
general, vague, and inconclusive. Id. at 420–22, 987 A.2d at 114–15. The Bomas court
additionally found that the testimony would not have been helpful to the jury and was
information within the jurors’ scope of knowledge. Id. at 421–22, 987 A.2d at 115. Because the trial court did not appear unduly biased against this type of expert evidence, the
Bomas court concluded that the trial court acted within its discretion in excluding the
expert testimony. Id. at 416, 987 A.2d at 116.
175. Cf. Benton et al., supra note 16, at 404–09 (evaluating cases in which courts have
claimed to adopt the discretionary approach and explaining that there are frequently differing rationales and outcomes within this approach).
176. Id. at 405–07. Benton and her co-authors noted that courts may view eyewitness
testimony research as lacking in “‘scientific or technical’” underpinnings, thereby placing
it within the regular knowledge of jurors. Id. at 405–06 (quoting State v. McKinney, 74
S.W.3d 291, 302 (Tenn. 2002)). Additionally, courts may find the information experts
provide on eyewitness testimony to be too general because experts cannot opine whether a
specific witness is mistaken about what he witnessed. Id. at 407. Finally, some courts do
not believe that the potential for error in an eyewitness’s testimony is best dealt with by
having experts duel over the meaning of the evidence. Id.
177. See supra text accompanying notes 153, 156.
178. See Benton et al., supra note 16, at 405 (noting that appellate courts typically review
trial court decisions related to the admission of expert testimony on eyewitness identification under an abuse of discretion standard that leads to few reversals). There is evidence,
however, that this view has started to change in some jurisdictions. For instance, in a 2007
case, the Supreme Court of Tennessee reversed a murder conviction after the court held
that it was not harmless error to refuse to allow a psychologist to testify about the reliability
of eyewitness identifications. State v. Copeland, 226 S.W.3d 287, 289, 304 (Tenn. 2007).
179. See Benton et al., supra note 16, at 404–05 (noting that seventy percent of states
purporting to use the discretionary approach had refused to admit expert testimony when
requested).
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than they overrule the exclusion of it, indicating that experts on eyewitness testimony remain uncommon in courtrooms.180
Because cross-examination on eyewitness identification is often
limited and courts routinely exclude expert testimony on that issue,
the question of how best to convey this information to jurors remains
open.181 Jury instructions, the third approach taken by courts and
one suggested by the Bomas court, present an ideal middle ground
between excluding this type of evidence entirely and only allowing it
through expert testimony.182
3. The Rise of Pattern Jury Instructions on Eyewitness Identification
Issues
Jury instructions provide a method for judges to instruct jurors
about the law and how to apply it.183 Pattern jury instructions, which
arose in the twentieth century, provide judges with basic models to
follow when drafting instructions and have been applied to the realm
of eyewitness testimony.184 This application, starting in United States v.
Telfaire,185 has not been without criticism,186 and states continue to
debate how jury instructions should be used to inform jurors about
eyewitness testimony research.187
The U.S. legal system places a great deal of faith in the wisdom of
juries.188 Ordinary men and women are taken from their everyday
lives and asked to decide matters of life and death involving strangers,189 and some of them might have only a rudimentary understand180. See id.
181. See infra Part III.C.
182. See infra Part III.C.
183. See Neil P. Cohen, The Timing of Jury Instructions, 67 TENN. L. REV. 681, 683 (2000)
(“Jurors cannot perform their duties without being instructed on the law they are to apply.”). Although early jurors were not instructed on the law, states have required jury instructions to be delivered in court cases since the late nineteenth century. Harvey S.
Perlman, Pattern Jury Instructions: The Application of Social Science Research, 65 NEB. L. REV.
520, 527–28 (1986).
184. See infra text accompanying notes 194–202.
185. 469 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
186. See LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 37, § 14-5, at 433 (citing a study that found that mock
jurors receiving the Telfaire instruction voted to convict at a higher rate than mock jurors
who received no instruction at all).
187. Compare infra Part II.C (discussing how Utah decided to make a jury instruction on
eyewitness testimony mandatory in cases in which identity is at issue), with Jones v. State,
749 N.E.2d 575, 585 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that a trial court was not required to
provide any jury instruction regarding eyewitness testimony).
188. LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 37, § 14-1, at 424.
189. Cf. id. (“Our system venerates the role of the jurors, lay fact finders, who are untrained in the law.”).
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ing of the law and legal system.190 In such a system, jury instructions
serve to educate these citizens about what the law is and how to apply
it properly.191
Pattern jury instructions, a standard set of definitions and explanations to be used in recurring types of cases,192 are popular because
they give judges and lawyers a firm basis for drafting instructions.193
In 1938, California became the first state to create pattern jury instructions, concentrating on negligence because more than ninety percent
of the civil jury cases tried in the state were based on that claim.194
Other states followed suit, including Illinois, which appointed a committee to craft jury instructions in 1955.195 Some states strongly encourage the use of pattern jury instructions,196 even posting them
online for easy access by lawyers and judges.197
As attorneys have attempted to present information on eyewitness
perceptions and memory to juries, judges have turned to specialized
instructions as one method of informing jurors about this research.198
Indeed, as early as 1954, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania ruled
that judges should “warn the jury” if evidence suggests that an eyewitness may not have made a positive identification.199 This early instruction, however, was an outlier, as most of the legal discussion
surrounding research into eyewitness identification did not begin until the late 1960s.200
190. See Cohen, supra note 183, at 682 (noting that “some jurors may know virtually
nothing accurate about the process they will go through”).
191. LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 37, § 14-1, at 424.
192. Id. at 424–25.
193. See id. at 424 (noting that judges tend to “lean heavily on approved ‘pattern’ instructions” in part to avoid being reversed on appeal).
194. 6 AM. JUR. Trials § 2 (1967); Patrick J. Kelley & Laurel A. Wendt, What Judges Tell
Juries About Negligence: A Review of Pattern Jury Instructions, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 587, 593
(2002) (describing as “influential” the publication of California pattern jury instructions by
the Judges of the Superior Court of Los Angeles in 1938).
195. 6 AM. JUR. Trials § 2. The Illinois pattern instructions were to be used unless a
situation arose in which the instructions were not applicable. Id.
196. Maryland’s appellate courts are among those that strongly favor the use of pattern
instructions. See Green v. State, 127 Md. App. 758, 771, 736 A.2d 450, 457 (1999) (noting
that the state’s pattern jury instructions “have been put together by a group of distinguished judges and lawyers who almost amount to a ‘Who’s Who’ of the Maryland Bench
and Bar” and “have been passed upon by our appellate courts”).
197. For example, the Seventh Circuit maintains an online library of civil and criminal
jury instructions from more than twenty states. State Jury Instructions, LIB. OF THE U.S. CTS.
OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT, http://www.lb7.uscourts.gov/reflinks.htm (follow “Jury Instructions” hyperlink under “State Legal Resources”) (last visited Apr. 15, 2011).
198. Benton et al., supra note 16, at 421–22.
199. Commonwealth v. Kloiber, 106 A.2d 820, 826–27 (Pa. 1954).
200. See supra Part II.A.
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The “most widely used”201 instruction on eyewitness identification
testimony came out of the 1972 case United States v. Telfaire.202 In
Telfaire, the defendant was accused of robbing a man of ten dollars in
a poorly lit hotel hallway.203 The defendant was arrested in the hotel
lobby a short time later and took the stand during the trial to deny
committing the robbery.204
Although it affirmed the robbery conviction, the Telfaire court discussed the importance of a jury instruction informing the jury of its
responsibility to decide beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
was correctly identified as the culprit.205 Because the trial judge gave
a lengthy instruction that focused on the issue of identity, the Telfaire
court found that the defendant was not prejudiced by the failure of
the court to deliver a more specialized instruction.206
The appendix to Telfaire contained a sample jury instruction that
has generated debate among legal scholars.207 The appendix sets out
the court’s attempt to “further the administration of justice” by laying
out a model jury instruction in identification cases.208 The court did
not make the instruction mandatory but stated that not using it
“would constitute a risk in future cases that should not be ignored
unless there is strong reason.”209
The Telfaire instruction focuses on the question of whether the
prosecution has proven the identity of the defendant as the one who
committed the crime.210 As the instruction states, the value of identification testimony “depends on the opportunity the witness had to observe the offender at the time of the offense and to make a reliable
identification later.”211 It focuses jury attention on the opportunity of
a witness to perceive a person or event and asks jurors to consider how
much time a witness had to perceive the event, the conditions under
201. Benton et al., supra note 16, at 422.
202. 469 F.2d 552, 558–59 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
203. Id. at 554 n.4.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 554–55. Indeed, the court emphasized the importance of trial courts including “as a matter of routine, an identification instruction.” Id. at 555 n.11 (quoting Macklin
v. United States, 409 F.2d 174, 178 (D.C. Cir. 1969)) (“In cases where identification is a
major issue the judge should not rely on defense counsel to request so important a
charge.”).
206. Id. at 556–57.
207. See LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 37, § 14-6, at 433 (noting criticism among lawyers
about the effectiveness of the Telfaire instruction).
208. Telfaire, 469 F.2d at 557.
209. Id. at 557.
210. Id. at 558.
211. Id. at 558.
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which it occurred, and the amount of time between perceiving the
event and the actual identification.212 The Telfaire court encouraged
judges to revise and adapt the instruction as necessary to the facts of
each particular case.213
The Telfaire instruction met mixed reviews. Some courts have
used it as a model in evaluating the adequacy of the instruction given
by the trial court214 and require an identification instruction in particular situations.215 But, many commentators have criticized the Telfaire
instruction as providing “nothing more than a few generalities,”216
while others criticize the instruction as being too beneficial to the defendant by making jurors overly skeptical of eyewitness testimony.217
Despite these criticisms, in one study of mock jurors, the jurors actually voted to convict at higher rates when given the Telfaire instruction
than when not given the instruction.218
In the years since Telfaire, more courts have begun to use some
type of instruction on eyewitness identification.219 These instructions
vary from short and succinct to more detailed, and the circumstances
in which courts employ them differ from case-to-case.220 The decision
on the type of jury instruction to deliver, much like the question of
212. Id. at 558–59 (identifying additional factors, such as occasions in which the witness
failed to identify the defendant and the witness’s capacity, in determining the accuracy of
an eyewitness identification).
213. Id. at 557.
214. See, e.g., United States v. Hodges, 515 F.2d 650, 653 (7th Cir. 1975) (“We believe
that . . . the Telfaire case propounds an appropriate model instruction to be applied in
cases where, as here, the crucial issue involved is the defendant’s identification . . . .”);
Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 391 N.E.2d 889, 893 (Mass. 1979) (recognizing Telfaire’s suggestion that defendants may be entitled to a jury instruction on eyewitness identification as
an “enlightened rule” and appending the Telfaire instruction to its opinion).
215. See, e.g., State v. Warren, 635 P.2d 1236, 1243 (Kan. 1981) (holding that in criminal
cases where eyewitness identification of the defendant is an important part of the prosecution’s case, a jury instruction on eyewitness identification should be delivered). But see
State v. Taft, 746 A.2d 813, 819 (Conn. App. Ct. 2000) (holding that there is no constitutional right to a jury instruction on the fallibility of witnesses), aff’d on other grounds, 781
A.2d 302 (Conn. 2001); Jones v. State, 749 N.E.2d 575, 585 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (holding
that the trial court was not required to give any jury instruction regarding eyewitness
testimony).
216. Handberg, supra note 2, at 1062 & n. 293. These commentators have instead suggested that the Telfaire instruction be delivered in addition to expert testimony and be read
prior to the expert testimony rather than the end of trial. Id. at 1062–63.
217. See Benton et al., supra note 16, at 423 (noting one study in which a researcher
modified the Telfaire instruction to be “more understandable to mock jurors” and subsequently noticed “an increase in skepticism towards eyewitness testimony”).
218. LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 37, § 14-6, at 433.
219. Id. at 430 (“A growing number of courts now follow this course [by providing a jury
instruction related to eyewitness identification], although few courts automatically reverse
a trial judge who fails to comply.”).
220. For a more detailed discussion of these types of jury instructions, see infra Part II.C.
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whether to allow an expert to testify, is generally left to the discretion
of the trial judge.221
Many of the jurisdictions using an eyewitness identification instruction model it after the Telfaire instruction.222 For instance, the
Maryland Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions resemble Telfaire in that
they provide jurors with a list of questions to consider in deciding the
credibility of witnesses.223 These questions include the accuracy of the
witness’s memory and the witness’s opportunity to see and hear the
things about which he testified.224 Critics of these types of instructions argue their effectiveness will be limited because evaluating the
accuracy of an eyewitness’s memory depends not only on citing factors
that may impact memory, but also on explaining how those factors
may do so.225 Additionally, although judges may instruct jurors to
consider a witness’s certainty or lack of certainty, researchers have criticized this factor due to its weak correlation with accuracy.226
Jury instructions have been revolutionized in the past hundred
years, as pattern instructions have become standard and as many
courts have begun to use a Telfaire-like instruction in cases involving
eyewitness testimony. But a handful of jurisdictions have gone beyond
these succinct instructions, seeking to comprehensively inform juries
about factors that can affect the reliability of eyewitness testimony
without using experts.227
C. Some Courts Have Adopted Comprehensive Eyewitness Jury
Instructions
Comprehensive pattern jury instructions, designed to incorporate
social science research into the courtroom, exist at the state and fed221. See United States v. Hodges, 515 F.2d 650, 652 (7th Cir. 1975) (recognizing that
giving a jury instruction about eyewitness identification fell within the trial court’s discretion while emphasizing that courts “should” provide such an instruction where eyewitness
identification is a “key issue” (emphasis added)).
222. LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 37, § 14-5, at 430–31. Although Loftus and her co-authors recognize the Telfaire instruction for drawing jurors’ attention to factors that can
affect an eyewitness identification, they also criticize the instructions for not informing
jurors how to evaluate these factors. Id.
223. MD. INST. FOR CONTINUING PROF’L EDUC. OF LAWYERS, supra note 72, MPJI-Cr 3:10:
Credibility of Witnesses, at 48.
224. Id. (also citing factors such as the witness’s interest in the case and the consistency
of the witness’s testimony); see also id., MPJI-Cr 3:30: Identification of Defendant, at 93
(citing witness certainty as a factor for jurors to consider in determining the accuracy of
eyewitness testimony).
225. CUTLER & PENROD, supra note 62, at 256–57.
226. Id. A variety of sources have discussed the lack of a connection between accuracy
and witness confidence. See supra note 101.
227. See infra Part II.C.
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eral levels. The type of instruction these jurisdictions use and the rationale behind it is instructive as a model for other jurisdictions to
follow.228 Utah, for example, provides a detailed instruction that
serves to incorporate the social science research into perception and
memory that would otherwise be provided through expert testimony.229 Utah began its road to reform the same year that the Maryland Court of Appeals decided Bloodsworth.230 But where the Court of
Appeals struck a negative tone toward eyewitness identification evidence,231 the Supreme Court of Utah in State v. Long232 reached the
opposite conclusion, requiring cautionary instructions in every case in
which eyewitness identification is at issue.233
The Long case involved an attempted armed robbery outside a
home in which the victims and the assailants exchanged gunfire, and
one of the victims was shot while trying to defend the home.234 The
shooting victim was unable to identify Long, the defendant, in a photo
array, but he later identified him at preliminary hearings and at
trial.235 Long sought a cautionary instruction on eyewitness testimony, modeled on the Telfaire instruction, but the trial judge denied
the request.236
The Long court held that the trial judge erred in refusing to give
the jury a cautionary instruction on eyewitness testimony and concluded that all future cases in which eyewitness identification is a key
issue must include such an instruction.237 The court articulated sev228. For a more detailed discussion about why courts should use these pattern instructions as models, see supra Part III.E.
229. In 1986, Utah began requiring a jury instruction on eyewitness testimony in cases in
which identity is an issue. State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 492 (Utah 1986) (“We are convinced that, at a minimum, additional judicial guidance to the jury in evaluating [eyewitness] testimony is warranted. We therefore . . . direct that . . . trial courts shall give such an
instruction whenever eyewitness identification is a central issue in a case and such an instruction is requested by the defense.”). The Supreme Court of Utah made this decision
based on the “overwhelming weight of the empirical research” into eyewitness memory. Id.
230. See id.; supra note 168.
231. See supra note 168.
232. 721 P.2d 483.
233. Id. at 492.
234. Id. at 484.
235. Id. At the time that police presented the shooting victim with the photo array, the
victim was still medicated and in the hospital recovering from the gunshot wound. Id.
236. Id. The jury subsequently convicted Long “of aggravated assault and possession of
a dangerous weapon by a restricted person.” Id.
237. Id. at 484, 492. Maryland, by contrast, does not require a mandatory jury instruction regarding eyewitness identification, but the Court of Appeals has held that in situations where uncorroborated eyewitness testimony is a central element of the prosecution’s
case, a judge should give “careful consideration” to a request for an identification instruction. Gunning v. State, 347 Md. 332, 354, 701 A.2d 374, 385 (1997).
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eral justifications for its conclusion. First, it noted that allowing
judges to employ a jury instruction at their discretion frequently
meant such instructions were not used.238 Second, the wealth of social science research into the unreliability of eyewitness testimony convinced the court that an instruction is needed in cases where
identification is a major issue.239 Finally, the court cited the lack of
knowledge among jurors about the “unperceived flaws” in eyewitness
identifications to justify its requirement of a cautionary instruction.240
The current Utah model instruction is divided into an introduction and four questions.241 The introduction emphasizes the importance of “identification of the defendant” and reminds the jury that
the prosecution must prove identity beyond a reasonable doubt.242
The questions ask about the following factors: (1) Whether the eyewitness had “an adequate opportunity to observe the person who committed the crime”;243 (2) Whether the eyewitness had the capacity to
properly observe the perpetrator;244 (3) Whether the eyewitness was
aware at the time that a crime was occurring and was “sufficiently attentive” to observe and recall details;245 and (4) Whether the eyewitness identification was solely a result of the witness’s memory.246
238. Long, 721 P.2d. at 487 (explaining that “trial courts rarely, if ever” provided a jury
instruction about eyewitness identification when they had the discretion to determine the
propriety of an instruction).
239. Id. at 488.
240. Id. at 492. Although the court required a cautionary instruction, it left some discretion to judges and lawyers to draft an appropriate instruction, provided that the instruction
includes certain factors known to impact the reliability of eyewitness testimony. Id. at
492–93.
241. MODEL UTAH JURY INSTRUCTIONS 2D (CRIMINAL), CR404 Eyewitness Identification
(Long Instruction), http://www.utcourts.gov/resources/muji/index.asp?page=crim (follow “400 – Stock Instructions for Particular Circumstances” hyperlink under “Sections”;
then follow “CR 404—Eyewitness Identification [Long instruction].” hyperlink under “Index of Instructions”) (last visited Apr. 17, 2011) [hereinafter Long Instruction].
242. Id. The introduction further advises jurors that they need not find the eyewitness
insincere in order to find the eyewitness identification to be “mistaken.” Id.
243. Id. Some criteria cited by the Long court for juror consideration in relation to this
factor are the “length of time the witness[ ] observed the [person],” the lighting conditions, the distance at which the identification took place, the presence of distracting noises
or other activity during the eyewitness observation, and “the extent to which the person’s
features were visible.” Long, 721 P.2d at 494 n.8.
244. Long Instruction, supra note 241. Jurors may consider the effect of stress, drugs or
alcohol, and fatigue, as well as the eyewitness’s “uncorrected visual defects” and “personal
motivations, biases, or prejudices.” Id. If relevant, an instruction regarding cross-racial
identification may be given. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id. In relation to this factor, jurors may consider the length of time that passed
between the event and the identification, postevent feedback that may have independently
influenced the witness’s recollection, and instances in which the witness gave inconsistent
descriptions of the defendant. Id. Finally, the instruction notes that “picking the defen-
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Current Utah law actually goes one step beyond the cautionary
instruction, also requiring expert testimony to be “routinely admitted”
in cases in which the eyewitness has identified a stranger and at least
one of the factors listed above is present.247 The Utah court’s position
in this regard, however, is unusual, and its reasoning has not been
widely adopted.248
Strong examples of comprehensive jury instructions also exist at
the federal level. The Third Circuit, for instance, uses an instruction
for eyewitness identification that incorporates many of the concepts
used in the Utah instruction.249 Like the Utah instruction, the instruction begins with an admonition that one of the most important
issues in a case involving eyewitness identification is whether the defendant is the one who committed the charged crime.250 It also mentions factors that can impact an eyewitness’s opportunity to observe,
including the length of time of an observation, the amount of stress
the witness experienced at the time, and the potential difference in
race of the eyewitness and the person committing the crime.251
These model instructions from the state and federal systems
demonstrate that successful instructions can be drafted to educate jurors about factors that can affect eyewitness testimony.252 They can
provide other jurisdictions, such as Maryland, with a roadmap for how
to rework their jury instructions to incorporate social science research
in lieu of using expert testimony.253

dant from a group of similar individuals is generally more reliable than an identification
made from the defendant being presented alone to the witness.” Id.
247. State v. Clopten, 223 P.3d 1103, 1118 (Utah 2009).
248. See, e.g., Bomas v. State, 412 Md. 392, 417, 987 A.2d 98, 112 (2010) (declining to
find expert testimony on eyewitness identifications presumptively admissible, noting that
“most jurisdictions have not embraced a presumption of admissibility”). But see State v.
Copeland, 226 S.W.3d 287, 307 (Tenn. 2007) (finding that it is not harmless error to exclude expert testimony on eyewitnesses in certain situations).
249. THIRD CIRCUIT JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 4.15, at 26–32 (2010), available at http://www.
ca3.uscourts.gov/criminaljury/Nov2010/Final%20update%20Chapter%204.pdf.
250. Id.
251. Id. The instruction further advises jurors to consider whether the identification
was made under circumstances that might have influenced the identification. Id. For instance, jurors are asked to consider whether police presented the witness with a variety of
individuals who looked similar to the suspect or whether the suspect appeared alone. Id.
252. See infra Part III.E.
253. See infra Part III.
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Given the concern that the legal system has expressed regarding
inaccurate eyewitness testimony,254 the consensus that has emerged in
the scientific community about the factors that affect perception and
memory,255 and the lack of knowledge that jurors have about this information,256 the legal system has a duty to act.257 Expert testimony,
however, has too many drawbacks to be an effective and realistic solution to this problem.258 Instead, courts should employ jury instructions, which provide a low-cost, effective means of communicating this
information to jurors without the concerns of administrability, cost,
and efficiency that come with using experts.259 Although jury instructions are often criticized, certain reforms, such as writing them in
plain language and using visual aids to present them, can address
these criticisms and ensure the instructions are understandable.260
States, such as Maryland, should look to Utah and other jurisdictions
with histories of using comprehensive instructions to address the
weaknesses inherent in many eyewitness identifications.261
A. Wrongful Convictions Remain a Concern for Courts and Require
Action
Concerns about wrongful convictions remain a pressing concern
for the legal system. Although there is a scientific consensus on factors that can affect eyewitness perception and memory,262 jurors are
unaware of much of this information.263 Given this state of affairs, the
legal system needs to act to address these problems in a way that will
prevent future wrongful convictions from occurring.264
Far from being a relic of the past, fears about wrongful convictions based on inaccurate eyewitness testimony remain a pressing concern warranting action by the legal system.265 A 2009 report on fifty254. See infra Part III.A.
255. See supra Part I.B.
256. See supra Part I.C.
257. See infra Part III.A.
258. See infra Part III.B.
259. See infra Part III.C.
260. See infra Part III.D.
261. See infra Part III.E.
262. See supra Part I.B.
263. See supra Part I.C.
264. Cf. COHEN, supra note 5, at xvii (noting that mistaken or perjured eyewitness testimony is the leading cause of wrongful convictions in capital cases in the United States).
265. See id.
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three wrongful convictions in New York found that thirty-six of the
cases involved the misidentification of the accused by the victim or
other witnesses.266 Similarly, a recent study by the Center on Wrongful Convictions analyzed eighty-six wrongful conviction cases dating as
far back as the mid-1970s, discovering that slightly more than half involved mistaken eyewitness testimony.267 Out of those cases, thirtythree were cases in which “eyewitness testimony was the sole basis of
conviction.”268
In addition to recent studies identifying wrongful convictions
based on eyewitness identifications, research addressing the factors
impacting eyewitness testimony also abounds.269 For instance, a 2001
study of sixty-four eyewitness experts found sixteen factors that more
than eighty percent of the experts agreed could influence an eyewitness’s testimony.270 These factors include question wording,
postevent information, and cross-racial bias,271 but studies have shown
that jurors remain unaware of how these factors affect eyewitness identifications.272 A 2004 survey of potential jurors in the Washington,
266. TASK FORCE ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, PRELIMINARY RENEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION’S TASK FORCE ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS
6–7 (Jan. 30, 2009), available at http://www.nysba.org/Content/ContentFolders/Task
ForceonWrongfulConvictions/TFWrongfulConvictionsreport.pdf.
267. COHEN, supra note 5, at xvii.
268. Id. Rather than merely being a concern of death penalty opponents, the fear of
wrongful conviction has been sufficiently strong to spur states and government agencies
into taking affirmative steps to avoid it. For instance, the Supreme Court of New Jersey
recently issued a report calling for mandatory pretrial hearings to evaluate the testimony of
eyewitnesses in all criminal cases due to concern about wrongful identifications. Emilie
Lounsberry, New Jersey Report Calls for Assessing Eyewitnesses’ Validity, PHILA. INQUIRER, June
22, 2010, at A1. The U.S. Department of Justice has even released its own guidelines to law
enforcement regarding eyewitness evidence, utilizing social science data to implement procedures designed to avoid wrongful arrests. NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE: A GUIDE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT 1 (Oct. 1999), available at http://
www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/178240.pdf (“During the past 20 years, research psychologists
have produced a substantial body of findings regarding eyewitness evidence. These findings offer the legal system a valuable body of empirical knowledge in the area of eyewitness
evidence.”). In particular, police lineup and identification procedures have been refined
in an effort to eliminate errors that might occur by detectives inadvertently giving confirming clues to witnesses or using procedures that are more likely to lead to a mistaken identification. Wells & Hasel, supra note 137, at 160 (noting that New Jersey, North Carolina,
and Wisconsin are among the states that have made reforms to lineup procedures).
269. E.g., Kassin et al., 2001, supra note 64.
270. Id. at 412 & tbl.4.
271. Id.
272. See supra Part I.C. For instance, experts estimated that many of these factors, particularly the weak link between confidence and accuracy, would not be part of a juror’s common sense knowledge. Kassin et al., 2001, supra note 64, at 412 & tbl.4 (noting that only
five percent of the eyewitness experts concluded that the link between accuracy and confidence was within the lay knowledge of jurors).
PORT OF THE
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D.C., area confirmed many of the experts’ suspicions,273 finding that
jurors did not have a solid grasp of how memory works274 and wrongly
believed that factors such as confidence were a good gauge of
accuracy.275
With this consensus among experts about factors that can influence eyewitness testimony276 and a lack of knowledge among jurors
about these factors,277 the legal system needs to take action.278 Any
approach needs to ensure that relevant information about eyewitness
testimony reaches jurors.279 Courts continue to debate the best
method for accomplishing this goal,280 but the drawbacks to expert
testimony suggest that pattern jury instructions are the best
approach.281
B. Concerns About Expert Testimony Suggest Jury Instructions Are the
Best Approach to Addressing Weaknesses Inherent in Eyewitness
Identifications
Expert testimony can teach jurors about the research into eyewitness perception and memory, but the cost associated with such testimony means it will not be available in all cases.282 Additionally, expert
testimony can consume a significant portion of trial time, making
judges reluctant to permit experts to testify in all cases.283 These con273. Schmechel et al., supra note 95, at 194.
274. Id. at 195–96.
275. Id. at 198–99 (finding that thirty-one percent of potential jurors indicated that an
eyewitness who seemed “absolutely certain” was “much more reliable” than eyewitnesses
who exhibited less confidence (internal quotation marks omitted)).
276. See supra text accompanying note 270.
277. See supra Part I.C.
278. The Supreme Court of Utah is among the few judicial bodies that have agreed
action is necessary to prevent wrongful convictions. See State v. Long, 721 P.2d. 483, 492
(Utah 1986) (“[W]e do consider ourselves compelled by the overwhelming weight of the
empirical research to take steps to alleviate the difficulties inherent in any use of eyewitness
identification testimony. . . . We are convinced that, at a minimum, additional judicial
guidance to the jury in evaluating such testimony is warranted.”).
279. Cf. LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 37, § 14-1, at 425–26 (noting that lawyers have two
concerns with jury instructions: (1) making sure the instructions accurately describe the
psychological factors of the eyewitness identification process and (2) making sure they are
delivered in “comprehensible language”).
280. See supra Part II.B.
281. See infra Part III.B.
282. Cf. ABA STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, GIDEON’S BROKEN
PROMISE: AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE 11–12 (Dec. 2004), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/legalservices/sclaid/
defender/brokenpromise/execsummary.authcheckdam.pdf (evaluating the lack of resources in many public defender offices due to budget deficits).
283. See United States v. Burrous, 934 F. Supp. 525, 527–28 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (declining
to allow an expert to testify on eyewitness perception factors because “this was to be a short
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cerns suggest jury instructions are the best available method for
presenting eyewitness identification factors to the jury.284
The use of expert testimony, while providing jurors with a great
deal of information, has drawbacks. The cost of experts alone is a
significant consideration.285 Wealthy defendants have no problem
paying for experts to testify, but cash-strapped public defender offices
cannot hire experts in every case.286 Even when the court has discretionary authority to appoint an expert, judges are reluctant to do so in
cases in which one party is indigent and cannot share the costs.287
Therefore, educating only some jurors about eyewitness identification
issues serves as only a partial step toward avoiding wrongful
convictions.
Additionally, courts may be concerned about confusing a jury “by
creating a battle of the experts.”288 While some cases surely turn on
the issue of eyewitness identification, a court may nonetheless resist
extending a short trial to accommodate expert testimony addressing
eyewitness identification.289 A related fear is the risk of overwhelming
jurors with technical information, leading them to ignore the expert
testimony completely and undercutting the reason for introducing it
in the first place.290 Because of these concerns about the use of expert testimony, jury instructions remain the best solution for informing jurors about eyewitness perception and memory.291
trial with relatively uncomplicated evidence [and] a lengthy battle of experts would be
distracting and confusing to the jury”).
284. See infra Part III.C.
285. See LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 37, § 14-1, at 425 (explaining that jury instructions are
cheaper to provide than expert testimony). A recent study addressing the inadequate
budgets of many legal aid organizations is illustrative. According to this study, conducted
between 1997 and 2001, one district attorney’s office in Louisiana spent $200,000 annually
on experts. Hannah Jacobs Wiseman, Pro Bono Publico: The Growing Need for Expert Aid, 60
S.C. L. REV. 493, 527 (2008). This district attorney’s office had a yearly budget of $3.7
million, compared to the public defender’s office, which had a budget of $1.2 million and
spent most of its $250,000 professional services budget on hiring outside attorneys in situations where it would be a conflict to represent two or more co-defendants. Wiseman, supra,
at 527–28.
286. Wiseman, supra note 285, at 527.
287. Id. at 518. Indeed, a study conducted by the Federal Judicial Center revealed that
slightly more than half of eighty-six judges surveyed had appointed an expert only once,
with many of the judges citing the cost of obtaining an expert as one reason for their
infrequent appointment. Id.
288. Handberg, supra note 2, at 1040 (internal quotation marks omitted).
289. See, e.g., supra note 283.
290. See Bomas v. State, 412 Md. 392, 419, 987 A.2d 98, 114 (2010) (noting the ability of
dueling experts to “leav[e] the jury more confused than aided by the expert opinions”).
291. See infra Part III.C.
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Jury Instructions Are an Efficient Means of Educating Jurors About
Eyewitness Testimony

Jury instructions are the best method for educating jurors about
eyewitness identification issues for a variety of reasons. Judges are already familiar with instructions and comfortable using them.292 Instructions can easily be incorporated into a trial and are compatible
with already existing instructions.293 They cost little to implement
and are efficient.294 Instructions also avoid the adversarial nature of
dueling experts and allow for a continuing debate within the legal
community.295 Trial judges retain discretion to modify them as
needed for the facts of any particular case.296 Finally, they offer a uniform and neutral means of educating jurors.297
First, jury instructions are an attractive alternative to expert testimony because they are already familiar to the court system.298 Jurors
are not trained in the law, and so jury instructions are meant to provide them with the essential background needed to reach a correct
decision in light of the facts.299 For instance, no one expects jurors to
know what the legal meaning of negligence is, or what the elements of
conspiracy are, before receiving jury instructions from the judge.300
For similar reasons, it makes sense to inform jurors about certain factors that can affect the accuracy of eyewitness testimony, especially as
many jurors are likely to be unfamiliar with these concepts or hold
beliefs that are contrary to the scientific consensus.301
Second, the rules surrounding the delivery of jury instructions
are easily compatible with the introduction of additional instructions
on eyewitness testimony, and the Maryland rules governing jury instructions provide a good illustration of this compatibility. These
rules require instructions at the conclusion of all the evidence and
292. See infra text accompanying notes 298–301.
293. See infra text accompanying notes 302–05.
294. See infra text accompanying notes 306–09.
295. See infra text accompanying notes 310–20.
296. See infra text accompanying notes 321–24.
297. See infra text accompanying notes 325–27.
298. Handberg, supra note 2, at 1061 (noting that “judges are already in the habit of
giving jury instructions, so they will find it easy to incorporate a new instruction”).
299. See Cruz v. State, 407 Md. 202, 209, 963 A.2d 1184, 1188 (2009) (“The main purpose of a jury instruction is to aid the jury in clearly understanding the case, to provide
guidance for the jury’s deliberations, and to help the jury arrive at a correct verdict.” (quoting Chambers v. State, 337 Md. 44, 48, 650 A.2d 727, 729 (1994)) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
300. See Cohen, supra note 183, at 683 (“Jurors cannot perform their duties without
being instructed on the law they are to apply.”).
301. See supra Part I.C.

R
R
R
R
R
R
R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\M\MLR\70-4\MLR404.txt

2011]

unknown

Seq: 38

TEACH YOUR JURORS WELL

13-JUN-11

10:42

1081

prior to closing arguments.302 In the court’s discretion, a judge may
also give instructions before the presentation of evidence or during
the course of the trial.303 In addition, the court is allowed to give the
instructions orally and in writing, and parties are permitted to request
additional instructions.304 Courts generally have a great deal of discretion in deciding when to give supplemental instructions, such as
those involving eyewitness testimony.305
Third, with well-established rules governing how and when specialized instructions may be introduced, using jury instructions to educate jurors on eyewitness testimony is both inexpensive and
efficient.306 Unlike expert testimony, which is often expensive,307 the
greatest effort in crafting pattern instructions occurs during the drafting stage.308 Use of jury instructions is also efficient because pattern
instructions are already a part of the trial process, making them familiar to the judiciary and easy to administer.309

302. MD. R. 4-325(a).
303. Id.
304. MD. R. 4-325(b), (c). Rule 4-325(c) has been interpreted to require the judge to
provide the jury with a party’s requested instruction when the requested instruction accurately states the law, “is applicable under the facts of the case,” and was not covered elsewhere in the jury instruction. Tucker v. State, 407 Md. 368, 379–80, 965 A.2d 900, 907
(2009) (citing Dickey v. State, 404 Md. 187, 197–98, 946 A.2d 444, 450 (2008); Thompson
v. State, 393 Md. 291, 302–03, 901 A.2d 208, 214 (2006); Patterson v. State, 356 Md. 677,
683–84, 741 A.2d 1119, 1122 (1999)).
305. Mitchell v. State, 338 Md. 536, 540, 659 A.2d 1282, 1284 (1995) (citing Howard v.
State, 66 Md. App. 273, 284, 503 A.2d 739, 744–45 (1986)) (noting that appellate courts
will not reverse the trial judge’s determination regarding the propriety of a supplemental
jury instruction unless there is a clear abuse of discretion).
306. Handberg, supra note 2, at 1061 (noting that “jury instructions are a low cost
solution”).
307. See supra text accompanying note 285 (noting cost as one reason that judges rarely
appoint experts to testify).
308. Cf. Handberg, supra note 2, at 1061 (“[J]ury instructions . . . take[ ] only a few
minutes at the end of a trial for the judge to read . . . .”); Johnson, supra note 74, at 985
(“Jury instructions . . . are both cheap and available to all defendants.”). Indeed, courts
can increase efficiency by using model instructions and modifying them to fit the facts of
the case without any added expense. The Supreme Court of Utah adopted this approach
in State v. Long, where the court set forth specific factors that must be included in an
instruction on eyewitness identification but allowed trial courts to modify the instruction as
needed to fit the circumstances of a given case. 721 P.2d 483, 493–95 (Utah 1986).
309. Handberg, supra note 2, at 1061. There are two factors that make jury instructions
easy to administer. First, judges present the instructions to the jury at a time when it is a
captive audience. Nancy S. Marder, Bringing Jury Instructions into the Twenty-First Century, 81
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 449, 495–96 (2006). Second, courts are generally required to do no
more than tailor the instructions to the particular case. See supra note 304.
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Fourth, jury instructions avoid the adversarial nature of dueling
experts.310 Pattern instructions are designed to give jurors a neutral
view of the factors involved with eyewitness testimony.311 If one side
uses an expert at trial, it puts added pressure on the other side to find
its own expert to challenge the first expert’s views.312 This adversarial
method could end up confusing jurors more than enlightening
them.313 The judge, as a neutral authority figure, is the best source
for this type of information and is more likely to be believed by the
jury.314 This is not to say that experts should not debate the science,
but that this discussion could be more productive when centered on
the goal of drafting neutral pattern instructions.
Fifth, the drafting of instructions itself can serve as a continuing
debate among the legal community.315 Beyond instructing jurors on
the law, instructions can serve as a medium for lawyers to discuss what
the law is and should be.316 Developing a jury instruction regarding
eyewitness identification is a way for the legal community to argue the

310. See United States v. Burrous, 934 F. Supp. 525, 527–28 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (utilizing a
jury instruction on eyewitness perception rather than allowing an expert to testify in part to
avoid a “distracting” battle of the experts); Bomas v. State, 412 Md. 392, 419, 987 A.2d 98,
114 (2010) (“Dueling experts could interject differing interpretations of statistics and scientific studies on identification, leaving the jury more confused than aided by the expert
opinions.”).
311. See Walter W. Steele, Jr. & Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Jury Instructions: A Persistent
Failure to Communicate, 67 N.C. L. REV. 77, 102 (1988) (“The court may not summarize the
evidence, express or otherwise indicate to the jury any personal opinion on the weight or
credibility of any evidence, or give any instruction regarding the desirability of reaching a
verdict.” (quoting UNIF. R. CRIM. P. 523(d))).
312. See Joseph Sanders, Expert Witnesses in Eyewitness Facial Identification Cases, 17 TEX.
TECH L. REV. 1409, 1469 (1986) (noting that the increased acceptance of expert testimony
may lead prosecutors to call their own experts “whenever the defense introduces expert
testimony,” which may then “cause defense counsel to reserve the use of experts to important cases where they perceive they have a distinct advantage in the psychological
literature”).
313. Cf. supra note 310 and accompanying text.
314. As one commentator has noted,
An advantage to having the judge read the instructions to the jury as the jurors sit
in the jury box is that they are physically present, with their attention riveted on
the judge. . . . The jurors might not understand all the instructions, but they are,
at least, exposed to them. Furthermore, they have heard the law from the judge,
a figure of authority in the courtroom. Having the judge do the reading reinforces the lesson that the law is to be respected and that the jurors are to try to
follow it as best they can.
Cf. Marder, supra note 309, at 495–96.
315. See Perlman, supra note 183, at 535 (noting that jury instructions are the end result
of an “essentially intraprofessional discussion” among judges and counsel).
316. See id.
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social science and how to apply it in legal practice.317 If new research
emerges that challenges older methods, judges can incorporate it into
revised instructions.318 Ideally, jury instructions are a jumping off
point that judges can adapt to each case and the unique issues it
raises.319 Unlike experts, whom attorneys must seek to admit in each
individual case, pattern instructions based on reliable science could
be used repeatedly and modified as the circumstances require.320
Sixth, jury instructions allow judges to continue to exercise their
discretion precisely because they can adopt instructions to the particular circumstances of a case.321 Courts that are hesitant to allow jury
instructions in every case involving eyewitness testimony may limit
them to cases in which the eyewitness’s testimony is the central element of the prosecution’s case322 or the facts otherwise suggest that
the eyewitness testimony is unreliable.323 Indeed, even though the delivery of a jury instruction on eyewitness identification could be
mandatory in certain cases, such as those in which the only evidence
317. This ability to debate the reliability of eyewitness identification science during the
drafting process of pattern instructions is an advantage of such instructions. In a recent
case dealing with the issue of cross-racial identification, one judge on the Maryland Court
of Appeals urged a Frye-Reed or in limine hearing when either party seeks to offer an expert
witness or jury instruction related to cross-racial identification in order to evaluate the
reliability of the science underlying the subject. Tucker v. State, 407 Md. 368, 384–85, 965
A.2d 900, 909–10 (2009) (Harrell, J., dissenting) (“[I]t has gone largely unexamined and
unresolved in Maryland whether the underlying social science, adequate to the purposes of
a court of law . . . supports a relevant instruction or the propriety of such an argument.”
(citation omitted)).
318. Cf. Kassin et al., 2001, supra note 64, at 414 (explaining that later research into
eyewitness identification science “will inevitably force experts to revise at least some of their
current assessments”).
319. Perlman, supra note 183, at 533 (describing pattern instructions as being able to
“bridge the gap between abstraction and case-specific instructions by providing opportunities for the judge to adapt the instruction to the facts of a particular case”).
320. Id.; see also LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 37, § 13-6, at 364.
321. Cohen, supra note 183, at 684–85 (emphasizing that judges have “broad discretion”
in delivering jury instructions).
322. See, e.g., State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 492 (Utah 1986) (requiring Utah state courts
to administer a jury instruction regarding eyewitness identification only in cases in which
eyewitness identification is a key issue).
323. See, e.g., State v. Warren, 635 P.2d 1236, 1244 (Kan. 1981) (requiring a cautionary
jury instruction about factors that may impact eyewitness identification “in any criminal
action in which eyewitness identification is a critical part of the prosecution’s case and
there is a serious question about the reliability of the identification”); State v. Cromedy,
727 A.2d 457, 467 (N.J. 1999) (holding that a judge should provide a cross-racial instruction where eyewitness identification is a key issue and is not corroborated by other evidence); State v. Green, 430 A.2d 914, 919–20 (N.J. 1981) (requiring an instruction relating
to eyewitness identification in a case in which a rape victim’s identification of her attacker
was a critical piece of evidence and the victim had been attacked in a dimly lit area at
night).
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against a defendant is an eyewitness identification, trial judges would
nonetheless retain discretion as to the wording and timing of the
instruction.324
Finally, instructions offer a uniform and neutral means of educating jurors.325 But unlike with jury instructions, such uniformity cannot develop with expert testimony because only a limited number of
trials will feature experts.326 Additionally, because judges and counsel
craft instructions in advance, and not from scratch in the heat of trial,
it is possible to tailor the instructions in a way that is fair to both
sides.327
There are indications this approach has succeeded in practice.
One such case, United States v. Burrous,328 involved the identification of
the defendant by the manager of a fast food restaurant whom the defendant had allegedly robbed.329 The district court refused to admit
expert testimony on eyewitness identification science, but it allowed a
detailed jury instruction that encompassed in plain language many of
the issues about which an expert might have testified.330 The judge in
Burrous later stated that he believed the jurors “thoughtfully considered” the instruction, as they had asked to review the eyewitness testimony and the police photo arrays before returning a guilty verdict.331
324. For instance, a judge could eliminate any reference to cross-racial identification in
a case where the witness and the defendant are of the same race. See Cohen, supra note
183, at 685 (recognizing the discretion that trial judges may retain regarding the timing
and manner of jury instruction delivery).
325. Cf. Johnson, supra note 74, at 985 (emphasizing their availability to all defendants
as one benefit of jury instructions).
326. See supra notes 285–87 and accompanying text (discussing how cost concerns may
limit the use of expert testimony in trials).
327. For instance, the judge in United States v. Burrous noted his efforts to craft a “balanced” instruction related to eyewitness identification. See 934 F. Supp. 525, 531 (E.D.N.Y.
1996) (noting that even the defendant’s eyewitness expert found the instructions “‘quite
fair overall’”).
328. 934 F. Supp. 525.
329. Id. at 526.
330. Id. at 530. The introductory instruction read as follows:
I want to caution you, first, that the kind of identification testimony you
heard in this case must be scrutinized carefully. Scientific studies have amply
demonstrated the dangers of mistake in human perception and identification.
Of course, this does not mean that the identification in this case is incorrect.
I merely tell you this so that you understand the importance of carefully evaluating the evidence here.
Id. (emphasis omitted). It also cited several factors, such as “weapon focus,” for jurors to
consider in determining whether the eyewitness testimony was accurate. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Weapon focus is the concept that recognizes that memory may be
influenced by the presence of a weapon because the eyewitness will likely focus on the
weapon rather than the assailant. Id.
331. Id. at 531.
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Indeed, legal commentators and members of the judiciary have
repeatedly recognized the usefulness of jury instructions on eyewitness
identification. Legal scholars, while often advocating for expert testimony as a means of educating jurors, have acknowledged the effectiveness of jury instructions in conveying scientific information.332 As
one legal commentator has noted, “In lieu of expert testimony, a detailed jury instruction from the court specifying those psychological
factors and police practices pertinent to the specific case may be designed . . . . [T]he efficacy of a comprehensive instruction has been
demonstrated . . . and can significantly inform juror evaluation of eyewitness testimony.”333 The Maryland Court of Appeals, long skeptical
of eyewitness identification evidence,334 even recently signaled that revising jury instructions may be the appropriate method to employ
when integrating eyewitness identification research into the
courtroom.335
Using jury instructions is an ideal way to educate jurors about
eyewitness research because the instructions are already familiar to
the legal system, cost little to implement, avoid adversarial battles of
experts, allow for intraprofessional debate, vest discretion in judges,
and offer a uniform means of teaching juries about factors affecting
eyewitness testimony.336 Jury instructions, however, are not without
critics, and this criticism has led many commentators to doubt the
effectiveness of jury instructions in the eyewitness testimony context.337 But incorporating certain changes in the delivery of these instructions would address these criticisms, making jury instructions
even more effective in educating jurors.338
D. Criticism of Jury Instructions Can Be Addressed by Reforming Their
Language and Presentation to Jurors
Jury instructions are often criticized as incomprehensible and ineffective in conveying important information, such as the science underlying eyewitness identifications, thus leading jurors to disregard
332. E.g., Epstein, supra note 143, at 783.
333. Id. (footnote omitted).
334. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
335. See Bomas v. State, 412 Md. 392, 418, 987 A.2d 98, 113 (2010) (“Indeed, it might be
an appropriate time for the Maryland Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction Committee to evaluate whether its current rule on witnesses . . . should be modified in light of the studies
about eyewitness testimony, and the scientific advances in this area.”).
336. See supra text accompanying notes 298–327 (summarizing the benefits of jury
instructions).
337. See infra text accompanying note 339.
338. See infra Part III.D.
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them.339 In response, scholars have advocated for particular changes,
such as the use of visual aids, plain language, and alterations to the
timing of instruction delivery, to improve juror comprehension of instructions.340 Adoption of these reforms would ensure that jury instructions regarding eyewitness identification would be neither
ignored nor misunderstood, thereby increasing their effectiveness.341
It is easy to criticize using jury instructions as a solution to addressing eyewitness identification problems.342 The basic model of
presenting them to the jury assumes a culture that is well read and has
the habit of sitting through long oration.343 As a result, critics of jury
instructions argue that jurors often ignore or misunderstand them,
rendering the instructions ineffective in educating juries about necessary elements of the law.344 Lessons from the field of education, however, could address these complaints.345
Educators have long known that not everyone learns in the same
manner and that varying the method of material presentation may
increase comprehension.346 Because the process of providing jury instructions resembles that of a professor lecturing to his students, insights from the latter could theoretically apply in the courtroom.347
In particular, three suggested reforms could have a significant impact
on juror comprehension: (1) writing instructions in plain language,
(2) incorporating visual aids, and (3) delivering instructions throughout the trial rather than solely at the trial’s conclusion.348
339. Cf. Handberg, supra note 2, at 1061 (“Unfortunately, jury instructions often work
better in theory than they do in practice.”).
340. Marder, supra note 309, at 510–11.
341. Cf. Judith L. Ritter, Your Lips Are Moving . . . But the Words Aren’t Clear: Dissecting the
Presumption That Jurors Understand Instructions, 69 MO. L. REV. 163, 199 (2004) (citing a
study in which researchers found significant improvements in jury comprehension, by as
much as ninety-three percent, when jurors received instructions that had been rewritten in
clearer language).
342. Cf. id. at 164 (stating that the presumption that instructions are understood by
jurors “is not supported by an adequate foundation”).
343. Cf. Marder, supra note 309, at 453 (“Typically, judges read the instructions aloud to
jurors, no matter how many pages they span or how many hours it might take.”).
344. Handberg, supra note 2, at 1061.
345. See, e.g., Marder, supra note 309, at 453 (“Lessons from the classroom . . . suggest
that a lengthy lecture is not the best, or certainly not the only, way to impart difficult
information.”).
346. Cf. id. at 504 (explaining that the use of various presentation methods would “be
familiar to any teacher or professor”).
347. See id. (“Judges need to be willing to borrow from other settings and to use tools
that have proven effective . . . in the classroom to convey difficult material like jury
instructions.”).
348. See infra notes 349–62 (discussing these reforms in detail).
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The first of these reforms, writing instructions in plain language,
is one simple and effective solution.349 One research study found that
simply rewriting a pattern jury instruction may double the number of
jurors who understand it.350 In that study, two legal scholars without
any specialized training in English composition or linguistics revised
several pattern instructions with the primary goal of increasing comprehensibility.351 When provided with the standard pattern instruction on accomplice testimony, less than ten percent of study
participants demonstrated a correct understanding of it.352 After
hearing the rewritten instruction, however, participant comprehension of the instruction more than doubled.353 Another study found a
similar increase in comprehension after instructions were rewritten,
with participants experiencing a gain of as much as ninety-three percent when provided with revised instructions.354
The second reform that may increase the comprehensibility of
jury instructions is the use of visual aids.355 Studies have shown that
many people are visual learners, and hearing instructions alone may
not allow them to comprehend the information fully.356 Graphics, illustrations, charts, and photos of key ideas, such as how memory
349. See Steele & Thornburg, supra note 311, at 90–91 (explaining the results of one
study in which participants exhibited a ninety-one percent gain in comprehension when
provided with rewritten instructions).
350. Id.
351. Id. at 93. As part of the study, the researchers read participants the instruction only
once in order to mimic a judge reading instructions at the end of trial. Id. The participants also heard only the instruction, without any factual context, to ensure that their
understanding of the instruction derived solely from the instruction, not from the facts of
the case. Id.
352. Id. at 92.
353. Id. The study’s authors acknowledged that, despite these gains, only about twenty
percent of participants understood even the revised instruction. Id. But they emphasized
that these successful results obtained from the work of two scholars without expertise in
composition or linguistics, demonstrating the gains that attorneys might similarly realize by
trying to make instructions more comprehensible. Id. at 93.
354. Ritter, supra note 341, at 198–99. In this case, the study’s authors began by examining California’s pattern civil jury instructions and identifying phrases that might impact
juror comprehension. Id. at 198. The authors then revised the instructions by removing
items deemed to confuse jurors, such as nominalizations, technical legal jargon, and
double or triple negatives. Id. at 198–99.
355. Marder, supra note 309, at 504. Indeed, simply providing jurors with written copies
of the jury instructions may increase juror comprehension of those instructions. See id. at
499 (arguing further that judges should permit jurors to take notes when the judge
presents the instructions to the jury).
356. See M.H. Sam Jacobson, A Primer on Learning Styles: Reaching Every Student, 25 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 139, 151–52 (2001) (discussing the growing number of students who are
visual learners and who might benefit from material presented in a “visually enhanced
manner”).
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works, could supplement the instructions in particular circumstances.357 For instance, judges could employ technology such as
PowerPoint to instruct jurors visually while the instructions are read
aloud, a practice effectively used by at least one judge.358
The final reform is to change the timing of jury instruction delivery. Studies have shown an increase in comprehension when judges
provide the instructions not only at the end of a trial, when a jury has
heard all the evidence, but also at the beginning of a trial.359 At least
one commentator has suggested adding instructions during the trial
as they become relevant.360 In a case that relies heavily on eyewitness
identification, the judge could deliver an instruction on those issues
before the first eyewitness takes the stand. Providing such an instruction and repeating that instruction at the close of the trial may aid
juror comprehension.361 By repeatedly referencing detailed jury instructions during the trial, trial judges could ensure that jurors were
informed about the factors that may influence the accuracy of eyewitness identification and could thus appropriately evaluate its
reliability.362
E. Excellent Models Already Exist for Jurisdictions to Follow in
Developing Their Own Detailed Eyewitness Identification
Instructions
Courts need not start from scratch in crafting jury instructions
that inform jurors about eyewitness identification issues.363 Strong examples from jurisdictions such as Utah have already been successfully
used in trial courts.364 States, including Maryland, should look to
357. See Marder, supra note 309, at 504 (citing use of diagrams, mini-summaries, and
other aids for juror comprehension); cf. Jacobson, supra note 356, at 152 (suggesting that
professors consider using “charts, diagrams, insets, shading or color, or . . . [other] visually
stimulating materials that illustrate the analytical concepts” to aid visual learners).
358. Marder, supra note 309, at 504 (noting that the judge who utilizes this technique
presented it at a conference and explained that he uses the presentation to emphasize key
points and terms for the jury).
359. Id. at 498 (citing Amiram Elwork et al., Juridic Decisions: In Ignorance of the Law or in
Light of It?, 1 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 163, 177 (1977)).
360. Id. at 499. For instance, before a law enforcement officer testifies about an eyewitness identification, the judge might instruct jurors that the officer’s testimony should receive no more or less weight than other eyewitness testimony based solely on the officer’s
position. Id.
361. Cohen, supra note 183, at 689.
362. See infra Part III.E.
363. See supra Part II.C.
364. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 328–31. Several other jurisdictions have
promulgated detailed instructions relating to eyewitness identification. See, e.g., supra text
accompanying notes 249–51 (discussing the eyewitness identification instruction promul-
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these examples and the way in which they incorporate social science
research as models in crafting their own instructions.
Lawyers looking for guidance on how to draft a comprehensive
jury instruction on eyewitness identification issues do not need to go
far. Utah is one example of a jurisdiction that has long used a detailed instruction in cases in which eyewitness identification is a key
issue.365 The Long instruction provides a wealth of factors that jurors
should consider in assessing eyewitness testimony, and this instruction
is worth examining at length because it incorporates many of the best
practices identified by social science research.
Utah’s eyewitness identification instruction includes a statement
that a person need not be lying or insincere to be mistaken.366 This
language is helpful because it can place an eyewitness’s potential misidentification of a defendant in context. That is, the factors identified
by researchers do not arise because the witness is clearly biased toward
a particular party or stands to benefit personally from a misidentification.367 Rather, the misperceptions and inaccurate memories of eyewitnesses are generally unconscious.368 Informing jurors about these
factors permits them to evaluate eyewitness testimony cautiously but
without automatically assuming that the eyewitness has lied.
The bulk of the Long instruction sets out the many factors that
may affect the accuracy of eyewitness identification, and it separates
these factors based on those affecting perception and those affecting
memory.369 This separation is important because the process of memory is divided into stages,370 and having jurors assess eyewitness testimony using knowledge of how memory actually works ensures that
jurors have a sound basis for evaluating the reliability of eyewitness
testimony.371 To be most effective, the instruction should reference
gated by the Third Circuit). For illustrative purposes, this Section will focus on the instruction given by Utah courts.
365. See State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 492 (Utah 1986) (requiring the use of a cautionary
instruction “whenever eyewitness identification is a central issue in a case”).
366. Long Instruction, supra note 241.
367. Cf., e.g., THOMPSON-CANNINO ET AL., supra note 6, at 212–13 (discussing a case in
which a rape victim wrongfully identified her attacker and suffered from substantial guilt
upon learning of the misidentification).
368. See, e.g., supra notes 146–50 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulty that
attorneys face when trying to cross-examine an eyewitness regarding cross-racial bias).
369. Long Instruction, supra note 241 (focusing three of its four questions on eyewitness
perception and one question on the witness’s memory).
370. LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 37, § 2-2, at 12–13.
371. Cf. id., § 13-1 to -2, at 353–54 (discussing the importance of educating jurors about
how memory works in order to diffuse “jurors’ absolute confidence in the eyewitness’s
accuracy” even in situations in which the eyewitnesses have been “substantially impeached
by their own prior statements or contradicted by other witnesses”).
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those factors that eyewitness experts agree may influence eyewitness
perception and memory.372
The factors affecting perception cited within the Long instruction—such as the length of time the witness had to observe a person,
the lighting conditions, and cross-racial identification373—correlate to
research findings in the field of eyewitness identification.374 It is important to discuss these factors in the jury instruction because it
grounds the instruction in science rather than on general assumptions lawyers might make about eyewitness testimony.375 Grounded in
research,376 these factors require jurors to think critically about the
conditions in which eyewitness identification takes place and factors
relating to eyewitness perception that could influence the accuracy of
the observations.
The Long instruction also asks jurors to think about factors affecting memory.377 It cites factors including the length of time that
passed between the event and identification, postevent feedback that
could influence a witness’s memory, and instances in which a witness
gave inconsistent descriptions.378 The instruction also notes that confidence does not necessarily equate to accuracy.379 Like the perception factors, this part of the instruction is grounded in research and
requires jurors to evaluate each aspect of an eyewitness’s testimony
carefully.380
At first blush, having jurors focus on so many aspects of an eyewitness identification might seem to bolster the defense. After all, increasing skepticism among jurors seems to only make it more likely
372. See supra Part I.B (citing the weak link between confidence and accuracy, crossracial bias, and postevent information as three factors about which researchers have
reached such a consensus).
373. Long Instruction, supra note 241 (listing these factors when asking jurors to consider whether an eyewitness had “an adequate opportunity to observe the person who committed the crime” and had “the capacity to observe the person committing the crime”).
374. See, e.g., LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 37, § 2-4 to -5, at 16–20, § 4-13, at 103–04 (discussing research that shows how the length of time a witness has to view an incident, the
lighting conditions, and a difference in race between a witness and subject can change a
person’s perception of events); see also supra Part I.B.
375. Cf. LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 37, § 14-14, at 442 (noting that many standard instructions contain “boilerplate language” based on “dubious” psychological assumptions).
376. E.g., id. § 2-4 to -5, at 18–21, § 4-13, at 103–05 (discussing research on the impact of
light adaptation, event duration, and cross-racial bias on eyewitness identification).
377. Long Instruction, supra note 241 (asking jurors, in its final question, to consider
whether the eyewitness’s “identification of the defendant [was] completely the product of
the witness’s own memory”).
378. Id.
379. Id.
380. E.g., CUTLER & PENROD, supra note 62, at 93–96 (discussing research on factors
such as consistency of description and eyewitness confidence).
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they will acquit.381 But, these factors can also benefit the prosecution
as they signal the circumstances under which eyewitness identifications tend to be more reliable.382 For instance, an eyewitness to a robbery who had a long period of time to identify the defendant and
immediately identified the defendant following the robbery is more
likely to be accurate than an eyewitness in a situation in which neither
of these factors was present.383
The Long instruction illustrates several concepts that should appear in any model jury instruction regarding eyewitness identification.
That instruction should emphasize the importance of identification in
the case, inform jurors of general concepts influencing perception
and memory (such as the weak link between certainty and accuracy),
and describe other concepts (such as cross-racial identification) as required by the facts of the case. Rather than starting from scratch, Maryland384 and other states can use this instruction as a template in
their ongoing intraprofessional debates about the reliability of eyewitness identification evidence.
IV. CONCLUSION
Wrongful convictions based on mistaken eyewitness identifications remain a concern for the legal system.385 Because jurors may
hold mistaken beliefs about how eyewitnesses perceive and remember
events,386 it is imperative that juries receive information about the reli-

381. Cf. Sandra Guerra Thompson, Eyewitness Identifications and State Courts as Guardians
Against Wrongful Conviction, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 603, 606–07 (2010) (arguing that state
courts may avoid admitting eyewitness identification evidence out of fear that “violent
criminals may be wrongly acquitted”).
382. Cf. Ebbesen & Konecni, supra note 68, at 23 (noting that prosecutors have used
experts to testify on eyewitness identification issues, even though defense attorneys use
these experts far more frequently).
383. LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 37, § 2-5, at 19, § 3-6, at 65 (discussing a positive correlation between identification accuracy and the length of time a witness views an event, as well
as an indirect correlation between such accuracy and the length of time that passes before
identification). This factual scenario is similar to that of United States v. Burrous, a case in
which the eyewitness to a fast food robbery did not identify the defendant the night of the
robbery, but immediately gave law enforcement a detailed description of the defendant
and picked him out of a photo array within days of the robbery. 934 F. Supp. 525, 526
(E.D.N.Y. 1996).
384. One legal scholar has already suggested that Maryland adopt a jury instruction on
cross-racial identification. 1 DAVID E. AARONSON, MARYLAND CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS
AND COMMENTARY § 2.57(B) & cmt. A (3d ed. 2009).
385. See supra Part III.A.
386. See supra Part I.C.
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ability of eyewitness identifications and factors that may affect those
identifications.387
Maryland and other states should pursue jury instruction reform
to ensure that jurors are well educated about eyewitness identification.388 Incorporating social science research through a jury instruction still permits the trial judge to act with discretion and also allows
lawyers to debate the instruction’s specific wording if there is a concern that it does not sufficiently represent the state of current research of the facts of a particular case.389 In this process, experts,
instead of testifying in court, can contribute their knowledge to the
drafting of better instructions.390 Additionally, courts could employ
visual aids and other methods drawn from education to ensure that
jurors comprehend the instructions they ultimately receive.391 Using
existing instructions from other jurisdictions as a model would permit
states, such as Maryland, to move toward full recognition of the risks
of mistaken eyewitness testimony and away from convictions based on
erroneous eyewitness identifications.392
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